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I. INTRODUCTION 
Trials are about finding the truth.  Truth-seeking is an essential 
function of trials under the “dominant official account of the trial 
and its proper purposes,” which scholars have referred to as, among 
other things, the “Search for Truth” model, the “Rationalist Tradi-
tion,” the “Rectitude of Decision” model, and the “Received View of 
the Trial.”1  By truth, I mean here truth about historical fact—what 
happened, whether the defendant in a criminal case committed the 
acts charged.  While trials also resolve other, softer questions of 
truth—normative, value-laden judgments about matters such as de-
grees of culpability, states of mind, and degrees of harm2—at their 
most fundamental level, trials are about resolving historical questions 
about who did what.3
But even on such questions of hard historical fact, truth will al-
ways be imperfect, and trials will always be imperfect mechanisms for 
ascertaining truth.  Scholars have noted that determinations about 
past acts or events differ from determinations centered on moral or 
normative questions, such as issues about states of mind or degrees of 
 1 D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial 
and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2004).  As oth-
ers have observed, trials also serve other objectives, including dispute resolution, “jus-
tice,” and a host of other values, which sometimes conflict with the search for the 
truth.  See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair 
Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1037–40 (1987) (noting that there are two different 
models of the Bill of Rights: a “search for truth” model and a “fair play” model); 
Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (“Ours is a ‘justice’ system, not a ‘truth’ system.  Overall, it 
seeks justice for the accused, even if it means that in the occasional case, a guilty man 
may go free.”).  
 2 And such questions can be especially vexing, posing, among other things, 
complicated questions of admissibility of expert testimony.  See generally CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE (2007). 
 3 As Michael Risinger has commented, questions of pure historical fact, when 
decided wrongly, are those that raise the most compelling cases of injustice: “Al-
though I have some fairly strong views on what the limits of criminal responsibility 
ought to be as to age, impaired intelligence, etc., I don’t regard disagreements with 
juries on such issues as raising questions of injustice of the same magnitude as real 
factual innocence.”  Risinger, supra note 1, at 1298.  Errors regarding “complex,  
no-one-right-answer, normatively charged judgments” such as state-of-mind questions 
or questions related to degrees of culpability are “just not of the same type or moral 
magnitude as errors convicting the wrong person.”  Id. at 1299. 
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culpability, because the latter turn on narrative accounts that are less 
susceptible to precise determination.4  But, while it is true that moral 
or value assessments are especially incompatible with notions of ob-
jective truth, issues of hard historical fact also turn on narrative ac-
counts that can elude accurate or objective assessment.  Lawyers are 
keenly aware that their ability to convince a jury of the “truth” of their 
client’s account of what happened turns on their ability to present 
the more compelling or credible narrative, the story that best ac-
commodates the evidence and the values of their audience.5  There 
may be a ground Truth—a reality about what in fact happened—but 
the best a trial can do is reconstruct a facsimile of that reality.  Yet the 
best-sounding story, the most compelling narrative, will not always be 
the true story.  If nothing else has established this yet, the more-than-
200 post-conviction DNA exonerations—cases in which scientific 
analysis has shown that the triumphant narrative at trial was wrong—
demonstrate that error is real and inevitable, at least to some degree, 
even on hard, binary assessments such as determinations of whether 
the defendant committed the actus reus or not.6
If errors are inevitable, we must decide in which direction we 
want to skew the risk of error.  Our criminal justice system ostensibly 
has decided that most risk of error should be borne by the prosecu-
tion.  Hence, we put the burden of proof on the government, and 
impose the highest legal burden at that—proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  As a corollary, we instruct juries that the defendant is pre-
sumed innocent, and we profess that it is better that ten (or one 
hundred) guilty go free than that one innocent be wrongly con-
victed.7  We load our trials up with procedural protections, comfort-
ing ourselves, as Justice O’Connor put it in 1993 (before most of the 
DNA exonerations had emerged), that “[o]ur society has a high de-
gree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the 
Constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting the 
innocent.”8
 4 As Christopher Slobogin has written, “although ascertaining objective truth 
might be possible with respect to acts, narrative thinking dominates attempts to recon-
struct mental state.  Any description of mental state is closer to a story than a depic-
tion of an observable event.”  SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 44. 
 5 Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 343, 346–47 (1991). 
 6 See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/Blog-Mo 
re.php. (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). 
 7 See Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Laws’ Epistemology, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 347, 358 (2007); George C. Thomas III, Bigotry, Jury Failures, and the Su-
preme Court’s Feeble Response, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 947, 978 (2007). 
 8 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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But contrary to that conventional assessment, our criminal jus-
tice system in fact does not put all—or in some respects, even a sig-
nificant part—of the risk of error on the government.  Our proce-
dures and rules—from investigation through trial, appeal, and post-
conviction review—do not always reflect a commitment to protecting 
the innocent.  As Michael Scott and I have written previously, cogni-
tive biases, institutional pressures, and systemic choices (including 
everything from police training to judicial rules of evidence and pro-
cedure) combine to enforce a type of tunnel vision, which makes it 
very difficult for a wrongly accused, and ultimately wrongly convicted, 
person to be vindicated.9  Add to that the unevenness of resources 
available to the defense and the prosecution, and it becomes clear 
that, in significant respects, the system is skewed toward putting sub-
stantial risk of error on the innocent individual, not the government. 
Many of these skewing mechanisms begin before a case ever 
reaches court.  Therefore, while the articles in this issue focus on evi-
dence law, to a large extent, by the time questions relating to admis-
sibility of evidence arise, it is too late to protect the innocent; the real 
skewing has already occurred at the investigation stages, casting the 
outcome in stone before the trial begins.  But of course rules of evi-
dence and procedure still matter, for in some respects those rules 
work in concert with pre-trial skewing to heighten, rather than dimin-
ish, the risk of wrongful conviction. 
Presentation of expert testimony, and in particular evidence 
from the forensic identification “sciences,” illustrates well this conflu-
ence of factors that can skew the process and undermine truth and 
protection of the innocent.  While Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.10 and Kumho Tire Co.  v. Carmichael11 promise protection from 
unreliable scientific or expert testimony, in practice they have offered 
little protection to criminal defendants; numerous commentators 
have noted that, under the Daubert regime, unreliable expert prose-
cution evidence is routinely admitted, often with little resistance, 
while some types of quite reliable defense expert evidence are rou-
tinely excluded.12
 9 See Keith A. Findley & Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292. 
 10 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 11 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 12 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions 
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003); Peter J. Neufeld, 
The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are 
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There are many reasons for this imbalance.  The barriers to ade-
quate screening of forensic sciences include some that arise outside 
the litigation process, including the nature of crime laboratories and 
the historical foundations for the forensic sciences themselves.  Oth-
ers are inherent in the judicial process, including the incapacities of 
lawyers (poorly funded and poorly organized defense lawyers in par-
ticular) to raise adequate challenges, the paucity of available experts 
to assist the defense bar, and the limited ability of lawyers and judges 
(and juries) to understand and evaluate the sciences.  Litigation of 
admissibility and related questions concerning forensic sciences in 
each case, dependent as it is on the abilities and resources of individ-
ual attorneys, judges, and “experts,” is a highly inefficient means of 
assessing “science,” one that is bound to get it wrong with some regu-
larity. 
Identifying these problems suggests a solution: less case-by-case, 
single-judge assessment of complex forensic science and more reli-
ance on expert panels of scientists to help assess the validity of foren-
sic sciences, establish the necessary protocols for reliable forensic sci-
ence work in individual disciplines, define the limits of such scientific 
evidence, and recommend of cautionary instructions or guidelines 
accompanying such scientific evidence. 
This Article considers these issues in several parts.  Part II out-
lines impediments to criminal defendants’ ability to develop and pre-
sent evidence of innocence, including both non-scientific and scien-
tific evidence, at all stages of the criminal justice process.  Part III 
focuses on the criminal justice system’s inability to assess and present 
scientific evidence, and how that inability undermines the search for 
the truth in criminal cases.  Finally, Part IV suggests reforms that 
might mitigate these problems, including the creation of a national 
forensic science institute or advisory committees designed to assist 
courts in accurately assessing forensic sciences, and in some cases 
supplanting the adversary case-by-case process for addressing con-
cerns about such sciences. 
II. FAILURES TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT: 
DISPARITIES THAT DISADVANTAGE THE ACCUSED 
A system truly committed to protecting the innocent as its high-
est value, to searching for a version of “truth” that is least susceptible 
to false positives, would look very different than the American crimi-
Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 143–49 
(2000). 
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nal justice system.  Despite all its procedural safeguards and professed 
concern for protecting the wrongly accused, the system is loaded with 
disparities at every stage of the process that put innocent defendants 
at risk.13
A. Disparities in the Ability to Develop Evidence 
From the moment a criminal investigation begins, the accused is 
disadvantaged by lack of access to crime scene evidence and investi-
gative resources.  By the time a suspect is accused or charged, the 
crime scene has usually been fully processed by police and relevant 
evidence has been taken into police custody.  Criminal defendants 
lack both access to the evidence and to police assistance in develop-
ing additional evidence.  If the crime scene is to yield evidence of in-
nocence, the defendant typically will have to rely on police and 
prosecutors to find, collect, develop, and disclose that evidence. 
Relying on police to manage and control the crime scene and 
the crime scene evidence is necessary and appropriate.  But it does 
carry costs to the innocent defendant’s ability to prove innocence, 
particularly because of the way the role of the police is conceptual-
ized in our criminal justice system.  Police are an arm of the prosecu-
tion; they typically work closely with prosecutors, who, while theoreti-
cally charged with responsibility to “do justice,” in practice often 
develop a conviction psychology in which catching and convicting the 
suspect is the highest value.14
As Michael Scott and I have described previously, police and 
prosecutors, as human beings, especially human beings in an adver-
sary system, are susceptible to a type of tunnel vision that can obscure 
the truth.15  Natural cognitive biases can lead police and prosecutors 
to reach a conclusion about guilt prematurely, and then to filter all 
 13 Values other than truth are also served by our adjudicative process that conflict 
with the goal of seeking the truth.  Those values, expressed for example through 
various exclusionary rules, include respect for “individual dignity, privacy, [and] 
freedom from unreasonable state regulation.”  Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials 
More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 107 (1996).  The presumption of innocence is 
itself a value that some suggest impedes the goal of determining objective truth, 
given that it ostensibly skews the risk of error in one direction.  Id.  But as I have 
noted, unlike many of the other competing values served at trial, it is a value prem-
ised expressly on an understanding that truth cannot be determined flawlessly; it 
does not so much serve values that compete with truth, but more reflects values 
about who should bear the costs of our inability to obtain perfect truth. 
 14 George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110–12 
(1975); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 328; Stanely Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous 
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 198 (1988). 
 15 Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 307–31. 
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subsequent information through the lens of that conclusion.  Cogni-
tive biases such as confirmation bias and hindsight bias, among many 
others, can lead investigators with the best of intentions to err.16
Confirmation bias refers to the natural human tendency to seek, 
recall, and interpret facts that are consistent with a conclusion one 
has already formed.17  Confirmation bias means that police and 
prosecutors—as human beings—are likely, once they have identified 
a suspect or formed a theory of guilt, to seek confirming evidence 
and not seek disconfirming evidence.  Accordingly, any ambiguous 
evidence is likely to be construed as incriminating, any incriminating 
evidence is likely to be viewed with heightened significance, and any 
inconsistent evidence is likely to be ignored or marginalized as insig-
nificant or unreliable. 
Likewise, hindsight bias—the “knew-it-all-along” effect—can 
skew judgments in ways that put innocent defendants at risk.  With 
hindsight bias, investigators (or lawyer or judges or any human be-
ings) are likely to take after-acquired information and project it back 
in time, so that an outcome will appear more likely or inevitable in 
hindsight than it really was.18  Hindsight bias can make it appear that 
judgments about the guilt of a suspect, or the outcomes of an investi-
gation or of a trial, were obvious and inevitable from the beginning, 
so that alternative investigative paths, suspects, or trials, are difficult 
to imagine.  If an initial judgment about guilt or a suspect is wrong, 
hindsight bias will obscure that fact and make it difficult to imagine 
how any different investigation or trial could have produced a differ-
ent result.19
Institutional pressures on police and prosecutors to catch and 
convict the criminals add to the tunnel vision that can put innocent 
suspects at risk.20  Unrealistic public and media expectations, espe-
cially in the wake of violent and sensationalized crimes, can and have 
resulted in pressure on police investigators to solve (“clear”) as many 
cases as possible so that the case clearance rates reported to the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and the public are not so low as to erode 
public confidence in police.21  And public pressure on prosecutors to 
convict may even be more acute than the pressure on police, because 
the prosecutor’s role in society is generally viewed narrowly as being 
 16 Id. at 307–23. 
 17 Id. at 309. 
 18 Id. at 318. 
 19 Id. at 319–22. 
 20 Id. at 323–31. 
 21 Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 324. 
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to convict offenders, while police perform a wider range of public 
service duties.22
Thus, the investigation and prosecution of cases in an adversary 
system has inherent biases that can help catch and convict the guilty, 
but also can produce flawed justice.  And, as has become obvious in 
the wake of the 200-plus DNA exonerations in the last two decades, 
wrongly convicting the innocent also exacts a toll on public safety, 
because each wrongful conviction of an innocent person also repre-
sents failure to convict the guilty.23
While initial investigations must be handled by police, a system 
that is truly interested in protecting the innocent and finding the 
truth would not make police an arm of the prosecution.  Instead, po-
lice might be made neutral inquisitors who work for the court or 
both parties, and not just the prosecution.  Police investigative files 
and crime scene evidence would then be made fully available fully to 
both parties, with appropriate safeguards to protect the safety of sen-
sitive sources of information or the integrity of ongoing investiga-
tions.  Some European countries do just that—they make the police 
investigative file fully available to both sides.24
Those European countries have an inquisitorial system, not an 
adversary system like the American criminal justice system.  To some 
commentators, the inquisitorial system is the superior system for find-
ing the truth, because the inquisitorial system places truth as its high-
est value, while the adversary system, by placing control of the facts 
and the litigation in the hands of opposing parties (who may be more 
motivated to hide or slant the truth than to find it), primarily values 
dispute resolution.25
While the United States is not going to adopt an inquisitorial sys-
tem (and I’m not arguing that it should), police can be reconceptual-
ized as neutral investigators in ways that draw on some of the prof-
fered advantages of the inquisitorial system.  As neutral investigators 
who serve the court and the parties roughly equally, police could play 
the role of neutral inquisitor during the investigative stages, leaving 
 22 Id. at 327. 
 23 In thirty-seven percent of the DNA exonerations, the same DNA that exoner-
ated the defendant also identified the true perpetrator.  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 119 (2008).  In many of these cases, the true perpe-
trator went on to commit other crimes that might have been prevented had the sys-
tem not focused on the wrong person. 
 24 Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1623–24 (2005); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 
390–91. 
 25 See Brown, supra note 24, at 1588; Strier, supra note 13, at 103–05, 107–08. 
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the prosecution and defense to remain fully adversarial—but more 
equally positioned—in their use of the evidence at trial.  By removing 
police as much as possible from the adversary process, and making 
them responsible in some measure to both competing adversaries in 
a case, some of the inherent cognitive biases might be muted to some 
extent.26
Absent that shift, criminal defendants are at a vast disadvantage 
in their ability to investigate and develop evidence.  For the most 
part, the only way defendants can now gain access to crime scene evi-
dence is through discovery, which means they must depend on the 
prosecutor to identify and disclose such information as the prosecu-
tor believes the defense is entitled to have.27  But discovery is notori-
ously limited in criminal cases, especially when compared to the ex-
tensive and wide-open discovery available in civil cases.28  Ironically, 
litigants fighting over money have far more access to the facts and 
evidence than does an innocent person wrongly accused and facing 
many years or life in prison, or even death. 
Criminal defendants not only lack full access to the facts and 
evidence developed by the State, they also have very limited ability to 
develop evidence themselves.  They have virtually no say in how or 
what police investigate; unlike prosecutors, they generally cannot ask 
police to look into alternative suspects or alternative sources of evi-
dence.29  And criminal defendants, who are largely poor, generally 
lack the resources to undertake investigations on their own that are at 
all comparable to the investigations undertaken by police.30  While 
 26 See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 355–96 (setting forth numerous recom-
mended reforms for mitigating tunnel vision in the criminal justice system). 
 27 Discovery in criminal cases arises from the prosecutor’s duty to disclose Brady 
material—evidence identified by the prosecutor as material and exculpatory.  See 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  For a critique of the Brady doctrine, see 
Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search 
for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129–54 (Carol Steiker ed., 2005). 
 28 See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to 
New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541; see also Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process 
Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1151–52 (2005) (listing 
some of the ways in which discovery in criminal cases is inadequate and “subordi-
nate[s] the truth-seeking function to other interests”). 
 29 As Andrew Leipold has observed, “prosecutors have enormous [investigative] 
authority: they have broad investigative jurisdiction, the assistance of professional law 
enforcement, statutory sanctions to encourage witness cooperation, and the credibil-
ity of the sovereign to support their efforts.”  Leipold, supra note 28, at 1127. 
 30 See Brown, supra note 24, at 1602 (arguing that “defense counsel have limited 
ability to extend investigations and prepare rigorous confrontations of evidence” be-
cause legislatures have so limited their funding); Leipold, supra note 28, at 1127 
(noting that criminal defendants are unable to gather evidence adequately because 
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state resources give the prosecution a clear advantage in criminal 
cases under any system,31 the “wealth effect” is particularly pro-
nounced in an adversarial process that puts the responsibility for 
generating evidence solely in the hands of the parties.32
In one respect, some criminal defendants do have an advantage 
over the police—they, unlike police and prosecutors, were present 
and know what evidence there is and how to find it.  But that, of 
course, generally applies only to guilty defendants.  Innocent defen-
dants—that is, those who played no part in the crime—usually have 
no unique access to case-specific information, and therefore are at 
the greatest disadvantage of all.  The only evidence they have special 
access to is alibi evidence.  But empirical evidence confirms what cas-
ual observers suspect, that alibi evidence is largely ineffectual.33  Fre-
quently, people cannot recall with any specificity what they did or 
where they were at some particular point in the past.  Not only must 
the defendant recall, but the alibi witnesses also must recall, even 
though the date and event may have meant nothing special to them 
at the time.  Any attempts by the defendant to remind her alibi wit-
nesses will be exposed on cross-examination and cast as improper at-
tempts to fabricate an alibi.  And alibi witnesses are usually the peo-
ple with whom the accused tends to spend the most time: family, 
lovers, and friends—the very people whose alibi testimony is viewed 
most skeptically as biased and manufactured.34  Thus, the disparity re-
flected in the lack of access to crime scene evidence and knowledge 
about that evidence is a feature of the criminal justice system that ap-
plies with unique force to innocent defendants. 
Moreover, pretrial detention makes the task of investigating even 
more onerous.  Courts, legislatures, and commentators have all rec-
ognized that pretrial confinement makes investigation and defending 
oneself more difficult.35  But decisions about pretrial release typically 
“defense counsel are under funded, either because clients cannot afford high fees or 
because the State dollars to fund criminal defense work are spread too thin.”). 
 31 Strier, supra note 13, at 144. 
 32 Brown, supra note 24, at 1604. 
 33 Elizabeth A. Olson & Gary L. Wells, What Makes a Good Alibi: A Proposed Taxon-
omy, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157, 158 (2004). 
 34 Empirical research confirms that alibi evidence is generally not effective if it is 
provided by people close to the defendant, such as girlfriends or family members, as 
is typical.  Id. 
 35 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2000) (providing for the temporary release of a de-
tained suspect “to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be 
necessary for preparation of the person’s defense”); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 527–28 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that bail 
“facilitates preparation of a defense and prevents incarceration of a possibly innocent 
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are based upon values and interests entirely independent of the in-
nocent defendant’s need to assist in the investigation and prepara-
tion of his defense.  Bail decisions are made on assessments of the de-
fendant’s risk of flight and risk to the public, not on considerations 
about the impact of detention on “the accuracy of the eventual 
trial.”36  As Andrew Leipold has observed: 
The problem is that the ex ante decision of whether defendant will 
appear at trial or commit other crimes bears no necessary rela-
tionship to the degree of assistance that the accused can provide 
in preparing his case.  Whether the defendant has ties to the 
community, a job, significant assets, or a criminal history tells us 
nothing about whether the suspect needs to help his lawyer with 
witness location, interviews, or other evidence gathering.  We 
might, however, hypothesize that there is a positive correlation 
between the falsity of the accusation and the suspect’s need to as-
sist in the defense.  It might be precisely when the wrong person 
has been charged that factual development, alibis, and hard-to-
find evidence are the most vital to the case.37
The risk of error is also skewed against the innocent defendant 
in other ways related to the ability to develop facts and investigate.  
Police investigators, for example, are free to lie or employ various 
forms of deception in their investigations.  Police routinely use de-
ception during interrogations of suspects,38 or in undercover opera-
tions or ruses designed to gain access to homes or the inner circles of 
criminal enterprises.39  But criminal defense attorneys may not em-
person”); Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986); Leipold, supra 
note 28, at 1130 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.2(c) (2d 
ed. 1999) (“There is little reason to doubt the proposition that pretrial detention has 
a significant adverse impact upon the ability of a defendant to vindicate himself at 
trial.”). 
 36 Leipold, supra note 28, at 1130. 
 37 Id.  Leipold also cites data indicating that the percentage of federal defendants 
who are released pretrial has dropped from sixty-two percent in 1990, to forty-five 
percent in 2002.  Id. at 1131 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (2002)).  
 38 See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH. 
L. REV. 1275 (2007); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 581 (1979); see also CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at xii (Fred E. 
Inbau et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (influential police training manual that teaches the 
use of deception during interrogations); Leslie Griffy, Fake Lab Reports Were Common, 
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 23, 2007 (describing common ruse employed by police in which 
they show suspects fake DNA reports in an effort to induce a confession). 
 39 See, e.g., State v. Moss, 492 N.W.2d 627, 632–33 (Wis. 1992) (approving police 
use of pizza delivery ruse to gain entry to a dwelling to execute a search warrant); see 
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ploy private investigators to lie in the course of developing informa-
tion—or at least they do so at some risk of peril under ethics codes—
even if the deception might develop truthful information. 
Two separate provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct bar deceit by attorneys—and, by extension, by investigators 
working under their supervision—but not by police, or even fre-
quently (by custom) by investigators working under the direction of 
prosecutors.  Rule 4.1(a) provides: “In the course of representing a 
client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of a ma-
terial fact or law to a third person.”40  Rule 8.4(c) provides: “It is pro-
fessional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”41  Rules 8.4(a) and 
5.3(c)(1) provide that an attorney may not order or counsel another 
to do that which he or she could not do himself or herself.  While 
these rules would seem to apply equally to both prosecutors and de-
fense lawyers, in practice, as noted below, prosecutors routinely su-
pervise law enforcement investigations that involve deceit without any 
risk of sanction.42  Moreover, police can operate independently of 
prosecutors and engage in extensive dissembling without violating 
the rule, but defense investigators never work independently of de-
fense counsel, and therefore cannot escape the rule.43
The disparity in practice is reflected in recent disciplinary pro-
ceedings against a defense attorney who used a carefully planned and 
limited ruse to get a witness to turn over exculpatory evidence to a 
defense investigator.  The disciplinary referee wrote that the District 
also Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 
OR. L. REV. 775, 778–86 (1997). 
 40 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2004). 
 41 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c).   
 42 Although a few prosecutors have been disciplined for some egregious types of 
misconduct (such as impersonating a public defender, see, e.g., In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 
1175 (Colo. 2002)), most of the disciplinary actions have been directed at private 
lawyers.  See Eileen Libby, When the Truth Can Wait, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008, at 26. 
 43 Wisconsin has since modified its rules to permit all lawyers to supervise others 
who use deceit in the course of an investigation, so long as the activity is not other-
wise barred by law.  See WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 20:4.1 (2007) (“Notwithstand-
ing [the general rule against deceit], a lawyer may advise or supervise others with re-
spect to lawful investigative activities.”).  Oregon has amended its rules to permit a 
lawyer to advise and supervise people who engage in deceit in the conduct of investi-
gations of violations of civil law, criminal law, or constitutional rights if the lawyer “in 
good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken 
place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.”  OR. CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 8.4(b) (2006).  Alabama expressly permits only prosecutors 
to supervise deceitful investigations.  ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2)(a) 
(2008). 
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Attorney, who had filed the disciplinary complaint, “admitted in his 
testimony that ‘prosecutors frequently supervise a variety of under-
cover activities and sting operations carried out by non-lawyers who 
use deception to collect evidence,’ including misrepresentations as to 
identity and purpose.  The Director of [the lawyer disciplinary board] 
agreed, calling it ‘normal practice.’”44  Both the District Attorney and 
the director of the disciplinary board also “admitted to finding the 
conduct acceptable for prosecutors, but not for private attorneys.”45  
The referee noted that “[p]rosecutors are even praised for successful 
investigations involving dissemblance, the record shows, even though 
they are able to apply for ex parte warrants, and criminal defense at-
torneys are not.”46
Likewise, police and prosecutors are free to offer inducements 
to witnesses for their testimony, but criminal defendants are not.  
Some of the most unreliable evidence presented at trials comes from 
jailhouse informants or codefendants—people who themselves are in 
 44 Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley, No. 07-AP-478-D (Wis. Feb. 1, 2008) 
(Referee’s Report and Recommendation at 22–23).  After carefully considering al-
ternatives, and determining that the contents of a computer possessed by a juvenile 
complainant likely contained exculpatory evidence that the witness would likely de-
lete if the defense alerted the witness or police of their desire to analyze the com-
puter, the lawyer arranged for an investigator to pose as a research company to offer 
the witness a free new computer in exchange for his old computer.  The witness 
agreed to the exchange, and the witness’s computer did indeed contain exculpatory 
evidence.  Id. at 5–10. 
 45 Id. at 23. 
 46 Id.  The Referee ultimately concluded that the defense lawyer had not engaged 
in misconduct in this case because the deceit was not “material,” id. at 14, the rules 
both as written and enforced were vague, id. at 25, the rules were only meant to pro-
hibit such deceit as would render an attorney unfit to practice law, id. at 21, and the 
defense lawyer’s Sixth Amendment duty to provide zealous representation trumped 
any restrictions that might otherwise have prevented this particular ruse, given that 
there appeared to be no alternative means for obtaining this evidence, and the 
sought-after evidence was at the time the linchpin of the defense.  Id. at 27.  The mat-
ter is presently pending final decision in the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  As the Refe-
ree wrote: 
Mr. Hurley was faced with a very difficult decision, with concurrent and 
conflicting obligations: should he zealously defend his client, fulfill his 
constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel, and 
risk breaking a vague ethical rule that, according to the record, had 
never been enforced this way?  Or should he knowingly fail to repre-
sent [his client] in the manner to which he was entitled and hand him 
persuasive ground for appeal, an ethics complaint, and a malpractice 
claim?  The Sixth Amendment seems to have broken the tie for Mr. 
Hurley.  A man’s liberty was at stake.  Mr. Hurley had to choose, and he 
chose reasonably, in light of his obligations and the vagueness of the 
Rules. 
Id. at 29.  Rarely would prosecutors be confronted with such a difficult choice. 
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trouble with the law—who testify for the State in return for promised 
or expected lenience or some other benefit in their own cases.47  Yet, 
any attempt by a defendant to offer anything of value as an induce-
ment for favorable testimony from a witness would be not only im-
permissible, but criminal.48
Similarly, although police and prosecutors cannot force reluc-
tant witnesses to talk with them, they can use the gravitas of their sta-
tion and their position of authority to persuade witnesses to cooper-
ate, either out of trust or fear of that authority.  And they can grant 
immunity to obtain testimony or use the law to sanction uncoopera-
tive witnesses who impede their investigations by hiding evidence or 
providing untruthful information.49  Criminal defendants and their 
investigators have neither advantage. 
Finally, as developed more fully below, the criminal justice sys-
tem skews the risk of error against the innocent defendant by giving 
the prosecution far superior access to forensic science and expert 
witnesses.50  Empirical evidence demonstrates that forensic science 
can be tainted by biasing influences when analysts identify too 
strongly with law enforcement and are exposed to case investigative 
information that goes beyond what they need to know to conduct 
their analyses.51  Accordingly, many observers have cited the need to 
 47 See Garrett, supra note 23, at 86 (finding that, of the first 200 DNA exoneration 
cases, 35 (18%) involved false testimony from an informant, jailhouse informant, or 
a cooperating alleged co-perpetrator); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional 
and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 660–63 (2004); see generally Ian 
Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563 (1999); Clifford S. 
Zimmerman, From the Jailhouse to the Courthouse: The Role of Informants in Wrongful Con-
victions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 55 (Saundra D. 
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) [hereinafter WRONGLY CONVICTED]. 
 48 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2000) (“Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, of-
fers, or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony 
under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a 
trial . . . before any court . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not 
more than two years, or both.”).  In United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 
1998), a panel of the Tenth Circuit held that a prosecutor’s offer of benefits in re-
turn for cooperation and testimony from a witness would also be illegal under § 
201(c)(2).  The court quickly reheard the case en banc, however, and reversed the 
panel, holding that the statute does not apply to the government’s traditional au-
thority to offer inducements to witnesses as a law enforcement tool.  United States v. 
Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 49 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (making it a crime to give materially false state-
ments to or conceal information from federal authorities); see also Leipold, supra 
note 28, at 1127. 
 50 See infra Part III. 
 51 See generally D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Ob-
server Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (2002); see also Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert 
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make crime laboratories independent of law enforcement.  Nonethe-
less, most crime laboratories are set up as an arm of law enforcement, 
either as a unit within a police department or within a State Depart-
ment of Justice.  This arrangement, which increases the likelihood of 
examiner error and hence can undermine the search for the truth, 
also makes the forensic sciences largely inaccessible to criminal de-
fendants.  Unlike the government, if the defendant wants forensic 
testing, she faces two obstacles: (1) she generally must seek prosecu-
tor permission or court authorization to gain access to the evidence 
for testing; and (2) she must find a laboratory and the resources to 
conduct the testing, or in some circumstances get a court order for 
testing in government laboratories.52
In sum, far from skewing the risk of error to guard against con-
victing the innocent, the investigative, evidence-collection, and analy-
sis stages of the process give almost all advantage to the prosecution.  
If the presumption of innocence truly puts the risk of error on the 
government rather than the accused, that presumption will have to 
be effectuated in ways that compensate for the defendant’s inherent 
disadvantage in the initial stages of a criminal case. 
the Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 422–23 (2004) (recommending in-
dependent crime labs); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal 
Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 470 
(1997) (recommending independent crime labs). 
The point is made dramatically by a recent study in which five experienced fin-
gerprint examiners who had previously analyzed fingerprints in a case and had all 
concluded that the latent prints matched a suspect’s prints, were presented with the 
same prints five years later, but were told that other evidence had excluded the sus-
pect.  Unaware that they had previously called the prints a match, this time four out 
of the five examiners (eighty percent) either declared that the prints did not match 
(three of the four) or that the prints provided insufficient information to permit a 
definite decision (one examiner). Only one of the five examiners adhered to the 
original conclusion, calling the prints a match.  Expectation effects caused by the in-
sertion of non-domain-specific information altered the conclusions of these examin-
ers.  Itiel Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Errone-
ous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 74–78 (2006).  The researchers 
conducted a subsequent study in which six examiners were provided eight sets of 
prints and were given subtle, routine, day-to-day contextually biasing information af-
ter having initially drawn conclusions without the biasing information.  Two-thirds of 
the examiners who received biasing contextual information made decisions inconsis-
tent with their initial conclusions on at least one set of prints.  Itiel E. Droer & David 
Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600, 610 (2006); see 
also Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A Need for Procedural 
Changes, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407 (1984); Larry S Miller, Procedural Bias in Foren-
sic Science Examinations of Human Hair, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987). 
 52 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 165.77(2)(a)1.b (2007) (authorizing the State Crime 
Laboratories to perform DNA analyses for criminal defense counsel, but only if or-
dered by a court). 
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B. Doctrinal Disparities that Put Innocents at Risk 
Certainly the presumption of innocence and the demand for 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt together create a significant advan-
tage for the criminal defendant, helping to shift the risk of error to 
the government.53  But are they and other trial protections enough, 
especially given the huge disadvantages that criminal defendants, par-
ticularly innocent defendants, have in investigating and gathering 
evidence?  As has been observed many times, there is good reason to 
believe that jurors actually approach cases with a presumption of 
guilt, not a presumption of innocence, or at least in very fragile equi-
poise on the question of guilt or innocence, which is easily pushed to 
a presumption of guilt as soon as the first evidence is heard.54  And 
others have noted that the burden of proving guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt has become diluted over time, and that it too is inade-
quate, at least alone, to protect the innocent.55  To evaluate the effi-
cacy of the system’s ability to protect the innocent, some accounting 
of other trial rules, particularly the rules of evidence, must be made. 
If truth in the aggregate were the only or primary goal of the 
criminal justice system, then evidence might either be admitted 
evenly for both sides, without any or much screening by the courts, or 
it might be screened for reliability in ways that are equally applicable 
to both parties.  But the American criminal justice system does nei-
ther. 
Some scholars have argued that virtually all rules that exclude 
evidence inevitably jeopardize the search for the truth.56  If evidence 
 53 Indeed, some commentators suggest that, because of protections like the rea-
sonable doubt standard and the double jeopardy bar, the criminal justice system is 
marked by “‘pro-defendant’ procedural protections.”  Keith N. Hylton & Vik-
ramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
61, 62 (2007).  While such rules are indeed “pro-defendant,” my thesis is that such 
rules permit us to tell ourselves that we put all risk of error on the State, when on 
balance our system actually skews the risk of error largely against the accused. 
 54 Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 340–41; Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, 
Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (citing Thomas M. Ostrom et al., An Integration Theory 
Analysis of Jurors’ Presumptions of Guilt or Innocence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
436 (1978)). 
 55 See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the 
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1165, 1170 (2003); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: 
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 105–06 (1999). 
 56 See 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 490 (Garland Publish-
ing, Inc. 1978) (1827) (“Evidence is the basis of justice: to exclude evidence is to ex-
clude justice.”); Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert 
Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 
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is logically relevant to a material issue, they contend, keeping the evi-
dence from the jury out of concern that the jury will misuse it in 
some way not only betrays distrust of the jury, but also unavoidably 
reduces the jury’s ability to find the whole truth.57  But admitting evi-
dence without restriction upon either party ignores the other dispari-
ties in the system, the effects of tunnel vision, and the fact that under 
our system wrongful conviction of the innocent is not an “evil” equal 
to acquitting a guilty person. 
If we accepted fully that our constitutional justice system prefers 
one particular version of truth, one invested as a highest value in pro-
tecting the innocent, then no relevant evidence offered by the de-
fense would ever be excluded because exclusion of any relevant ex-
culpatory evidence will always increase the risk of wrongly convicting 
the innocent.  Indeed, Katherine Goldwasser has argued that, be-
cause a criminal defendant has unique constitutional rights, exclu-
sion of any relevant evidence offered by a defendant based on reli-
ability concerns is improper.58  Excluding such relevant evidence 
because of concerns about its reliability, she argues, is incompatible 
with the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense,59 and 
even more so with the right not to be convicted except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to trial by jury.60  Similarly, 
although somewhat more modestly, Janet Hoeffel has argued that, 
under the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, relevant 
evidence offered by a criminal defendant is not properly excluded 
based on any reliability concerns “unless it is ‘always so untrustworthy 
and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility [i.e., 
“cross-examination, presentation of witnesses, closing arguments, jury 
22 (2003) (noting that “pure adversaryists . . . would say that truth best emerges in 
the clash of self-interested parties packaging whatever relevant information is avail-
able in the most persuasive way they can . . . and that, essentially the system would 
work best if there were no rules of evidence beyond a weak relevance check”); Strier, 
supra note 13, at 109 (arguing that most rules that exclude relevant evidence should 
be abolished or minimized because they all impede the search for the truth). 
 57 Strier, supra note 13, at 109. 
 58 Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of 
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding 
Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621 (1998); see also Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 
803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 975 (2008). 
 59 Goldwasser, supra note 58, at 622. 
 60 Id. at 623. 
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instructions . . . ,”61] that it should disable a defendant from present-
ing her version of the events for which she is on trial.’”62
If accepted, these principles would reflect a commitment to pro-
tecting the innocent as an institutional value of the highest order.63  
Excluding defense and prosecution evidence on the same footing out 
of doubts about the reliability of the evidence might, on balance, in-
crease the chances of getting the truth in the greatest number of 
cases in aggregate.  But because some of that defense evidence, ex-
cluded as unreliable, might in fact have been entirely accurate in 
some unknown percentage of cases, excluding such evidence as a 
category will mean that some innocent people will be convicted who 
might not have been if their evidence had been heard by the jury.64
 61 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1289. 
 62 Id. at 1352 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).  Hoeffel argues 
that “the purpose of the [Compulsory Process] Clause was to allow for the introduc-
tion of evidence by the accused through the adversarial process[,]” and that “[t]he 
Clause aids in the search for truth across all cases by giving the defendant a proce-
dure that allows his side of the case, and not just the prosecution’s, to be heard by 
the jury.”  Id. at 1277. 
 63 Different rules of admissibility for defense-proffered and prosecution-proffered 
evidence would of course create stark asymmetries in the way evidence law is applied 
in criminal cases.  But the constitutional values at work here expressly endorse asym-
metry.  As one court has put it: 
A criminal prosecution, unlike a civil trial, is in no sense a symmetrical 
proceeding.  The prosecution assumes substantial affirmative obliga-
tions and accepts numerous restrictions, neither of which are imposed 
on the defendant. . . .  The system of criminal law administration in-
volves not only this procedural imbalance in favor of the defendant, 
but also important aspects of the Government’s law enforcement power 
that are not available to the defendant. . . .  But in the context of a 
criminal investigation and criminal trials . . . equalization is not a sound 
principle . . . . 
United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774–75 (2d. Cir. 1980).  Hoeffel explains: 
While the one-sided application of a favorable constitutional standard 
may appear unfair, it is not.  In a criminal case, the parties are assumed 
to be on an unequal footing.  The bundle of rights in the Sixth 
Amendment—the right to notice, counsel, confrontation and compul-
sory process—were intended to offset the inherent imbalance between 
the relatively powerful State and the powerless, resourceless defendant.  
The parties are also on an unequal footing, however, because the de-
fendant’s very liberty is at stake.  The criminal justice system as de-
signed to reflect the most undesirable verdict as that of the conviction 
of the innocent. 
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1360–61. 
 64 Randolph Jonakait has thus argued that the Sixth Amendment is intended to 
protect the ability of individual defendants to stand up to the power of the State, 
even if it comes at some cost to ascertaining the truth in the aggregate: 
The rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process 
constitutionalize the adversary system, and while we presume truth 
comes out of this system, the converging [S]ixth [A]mendment protec-
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In any event, our system accepts that some judicial gate-keeping 
is appropriate to filter out evidence for a variety of reasons, including 
concern about reliability.65  As Goldwasser has put it, “[o]ne suppos-
edly good reason for excluding relevant evidence—recognized in all 
jurisdictions—is that the evidence, although logically probative of 
something that matters in the lawsuit, is not sufficiently reliable.”66  
Rules reflecting this gatekeeping function premised on reliability 
concerns include the “best evidence” rule,67 the rule against hearsay,68 
and rules limiting the admissibility of scientific evidence.69  Another 
related reason for excluding relevant evidence, also reflected in the 
rules of evidence in all jurisdictions, is the concern that some evi-
dence, even if relevant and reliable, might be unfairly prejudicial—
and hence might be used in a way that renders the factfinder’s con-
clusions unreliable.70
At the very least, because “truthfinding is not the only value at 
stake” in criminal trials, additional values reflected in the defendant’s 
right to present a defense, to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
to trial by jury, argue for restraint when excluding defense evidence 
tions guarantee neither accurate determinations nor even the most re-
liable way to ascertain the fact.  Instead, the accused is guaranteed an 
adversary criminal trial even if that is not the best truth-determining 
process for him . . . . [T]he accused cannot be denied an adversary 
criminal trial even if an inquisitorial proceeding would have deter-
mined the truth better in the accused’s case. 
Randolph Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA 
L. REV. 557, 585 (1988) (footnote omitted); see Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confron-
tation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 754. 
 65 In a related way, Mark Denbeaux and Michael Risinger have observed: 
[N]o one argues in favor of a pure adversary system for the simple rea-
son that such a pure system, like direct democracy, could not function 
except under exceedingly rare conditions.  This is because a pure ad-
versary system would have no judge, in the sense we are accustomed to.  
The parties would be free to present whatever they themselves deter-
mined to be helpful to their cause, and the party with the weakest case 
could filibuster indefinitely . . . . 
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 56 at 21. 
 66 Goldwasser, supra, note 58, at 622.  Goldwasser elaborates: “Viewed solely from 
an evidence law perspective, excluding unreliable evidence makes a good deal of 
sense.  After all, the chief function of evidence law (at least by most accounts) is to 
maximize the probability that the trier of fact will arrive at an accurate determination 
of historical truth.”  Id. at 632. 
 67 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 68 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802; Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, Does Evidence Law Matter in 
Criminal Suppression Hearings?, 25 LOY. L. REV. 987, 999 (1992) (“[H]earsay is ex-
cluded at trial precisely because it is unreliable.”). 
 69 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. 
 70 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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based upon reliability considerations.71  Viewed without the gloss of 
these constitutional values, the goal of minimizing the risk of an in-
correct outcome “means minimizing the risk of either of two possi-
bilities: the conviction of an innocent person, or the acquittal of a 
guilty one.”72  But because the Constitution—and in particular the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—puts a much 
higher value on preventing conviction of the innocent than on pre-
venting acquittal of the guilty, these two possible “incorrect” out-
comes are not equally unacceptable.73  As Janet Hoeffel has put it, 
“constitutional law has recognized that the primary function of a 
criminal trial may not be truth-seeking, but the accused’s right to a 
just and fair verdict.”74  Hence, Goldwasser argues, these constitu-
tional values “simply cannot be squared with allowing courts to ex-
clude a criminal defendant’s evidence because of unreliability.”75
1. Rules that Purport to Protect Innocents 
Some doctrines recognize the risk to the innocent posed by rules 
that exclude defense evidence.  The constitutional right to present a 
defense, implicit in the right to compulsory process, for example, in 
theory recognizes the defendant’s special constitutional claim to 
voice at trial.  But the Supreme Court’s right-to-present-a-defense 
cases are confused and contradictory, and have been interpreted to 
permit considerable restraint on a defendant’s ability to present evi-
dence.76  And the Compulsory Process Clause is largely ignored in 
criminal jurisprudence.77
 71 Goldwasser, supra, note 58, at 632–42. 
 72 Id. at 633. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science 
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41, 73 (2001). 
 75 Goldwasser, supra note 58, at 632.  Excluding relevant but unreliable defense 
evidence might reduce the chances of a wrong acquittal.  But it does so only by also 
producing an occasional wrong conviction.  Goldwasser argues: “Producing fewer 
wrong acquittals at the cost of also producing a few additional wrong convictions is 
not [consistent with reasonable doubt values].”  Id. at 635. 
 76 In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), 
and Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), the Supreme Court described the 
right to present a defense broadly, suggesting that the defense must be permitted to 
introduce any evidence as long as “the evidence can be adequately measured by the 
jury through the usual machinery of the adversary system—cross-examination, pres-
entation of witnesses, closing arguments, jury instructions . . . .”  Hoeffel, supra note 
1, at 1289.  In other cases, however, the Court has appeared to narrow the constitu-
tional right, permitting evidentiary rules to limit defense evidence if those rules have 
a rational basis, including a concern for reliability of the evidence.  See, e.g., Scheffer 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).  For a thorough analysis of this dichotomy in 
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Other doctrines recognize the defendant’s special claim to a 
right to present evidence in more subtle (and even less universally 
accepted) ways.  For example, a few courts permit more leeway for 
defense use of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” than for 
prosecution use of such evidence.78  Such “other acts” evidence is 
generally inadmissible to prove character, that is, to prove that a per-
son had a propensity to commit the act at issue.79  When other acts 
evidence is offered for a permissible purpose apart from proving 
character or propensity, it is still subject to exclusion unless a court is 
satisfied that its prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh its 
probative value.80  Because it is generally the government that seeks 
to introduce other acts evidence—usually to show that a defendant’s 
prior conduct helps to prove guilt on pending charges81—the rule 
against propensity evidence is most often raised in defense efforts to 
exclude evidence offered by the government.  When invoked to pro-
hibit the defense from introducing other acts evidence (so-called “re-
verse 404(b)” evidence)—usually evidence of an alternative suspect’s 
prior conduct82—some courts recognize that there is less danger of 
unfair prejudice than when the prosecution uses other acts evidence 
against the defendant himself.  A defendant can be prejudiced di-
rectly by evidence that he committed other or similar crimes in the 
past, or evidence suggesting that he is a bad person.  But some courts 
have noted that because the third-party suspect is not on trial, there is 
less concern that the other acts evidence will be prejudicial in that 
the Supreme Court’s right-to-present-a-defense cases, see Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 
1288–1306, and SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
 77 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1276 (The Supreme Court has read the Compulsory 
Process Clause “to stand for nothing less than the accused’s ‘right to present a de-
fense.’ . . . Yet, for reasons that are not entirely clear, litigants, courts, and scholars 
barely give it a nod.”) (citations omitted). 
 78 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 79 See id. 
 80 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 81 Other acts evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove facts other than 
propensity or character, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” or other similar matters.  
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  Increasingly, courts liberally invoke those exceptions to admit 
other acts evidence, coming very near to allowing the exceptions to swallow the rule. 
 82 Numerous authorities recognize that a defendant may use similar other-crimes 
evidence defensively if it reasonably tends to negate his guilt of the charged crime.  
See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163, 166–67 (5th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth 
v. Murphy, 185 N.E. 486, 488 (Mass. 1933); State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Minn. 
1949); State v. Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Wis. 1999); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 
304, 341 (3d ed. 1940). 
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sense.  These courts, accordingly, apply a less rigorous relevancy re-
quirement or prejudice analysis.83
Other rules or doctrines also reflect special concern for the 
status and constitutional rights of criminal defendants in other ways.  
Those doctrines include the defendant’s right to confront her accus-
ers,84 her right to silence, rules that protect the confidentiality and 
privilege of the defendant’s communications with counsel, and non-
reciprocal rules requiring disclosure of evidence under the Brady85 
doctrine.  This last asymmetry, under which the government is re-
quired to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense, but 
the defendant has no corresponding constitutional duty to disclose 
inculpatory evidence to the prosecution, is moderated to some de-
gree by reciprocal discovery statutes that most jurisdictions have 
adopted.  Under such statutes, a defendant’s right to obtain some 
types of prosecution evidence (frequently scientific evidence) is con-
 83 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404–05 (3d Cir. 1991); State 
v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1978).  In Garfole, the court held: 
     We are of the view, however, that a lower standard of degree of simi-
larity of offenses may justly be required of a defendant using other-
crimes evidence defensively than is exacted from the State when such 
evidence is used incriminatorily.  As indicated above, other-crimes evi-
dence submitted by the prosecution has the distinct capacity of preju-
dicing the accused.  Even instructions by the trial judge may not satis-
factorily insulate the defendant from the hazard of the jury using such 
evidence improperly to find him guilty of the offense charged merely 
because they believe he has committed a similar offense before.  
Therefore a fairly rigid standard of similarity may be required of the 
State if its effort is to establish the existence of a common offender by 
the mere similarity of the offenses.  [State v. Sempsey, 141 N.J. Super. 
317, 323 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.).]  But when the defendant is offer-
ing that kind of proof exculpatorily, prejudice to the defendant is no 
longer a factor, and simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suf-
fice as the standard of admissibility, since ordinarily, and subject to 
rules of competency, an accused is entitled to advance in his defense 
any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress 
his innocence of the charge made.  [See N.J. R. EVID. 1(2).]  The appli-
cation of a modified requirement of relevancy to the proffer by a de-
fendant is additionally justified by the consideration that the defendant 
need only engender reasonable doubt of his guilt whereas the State 
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 591 (footnote omitted).  But see State v. Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 671 (Wis. 
1999) (rejecting the relaxed Garfole test, but still holding “that the standards of rele-
vancy are stricter when the state seeks to introduce other crimes evidence to prove 
identity because ‘the prejudice [resulting from such evidence] is apt to be relatively 
greater than the probative value.’”) (quoting Whitty v. State, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564 
(Wis. 1967) (alteration in original)). 
 84 The Confrontation Clause, of course, has received considerable new force in 
light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004). 
 85 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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tingent on the defendant’s obligation to provide similar evidence to 
the prosecution.86
Special rules also exist, in theory, for protecting criminal defen-
dants against other types of potentially unreliable evidence.  The Su-
preme Court has long recognized that eyewitness identifications can 
be hopelessly unreliable.87  Indeed, the DNA exonerations confirm 
that mistaken eyewitness identification is by far the leading cause of 
wrongful convictions of the innocent, accounting for or present in 
nearly eighty percent of all such convictions.88  The Court has strug-
gled with developing a doctrine that can protect against convictions 
based upon mistaken identifications.  In its first attempts to solve the 
problem in United States v. Wade89 and Gilbert v. California,90 the Court 
declared that defendants have a right to counsel at a live-person 
lineup.  But that remedy offered little protection, because most iden-
tifications are made from photo arrays, not live-person lineups, and 
the Court subsequently was not willing to impose a right to counsel at 
photo viewings.91  Moreover, many if not most identifications occur 
prior to formal charging, and hence prior to the point when the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, so even most live lineups 
could still be conducted without the presence of counsel.  Because 
the right to counsel could not alone solve the problem of mistaken 
eyewitness identification testimony, the Court ultimately turned to 
the Due Process Clause to find a right to exclude eyewitness evidence 
because of its unreliability.92
Initially, it appeared that the Court’s Due Process analysis was 
going to approach the problem of eyewitness error as a process ques-
tion rather than a reliability question.  On the same day that it de-
 86 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b). 
 87 The Supreme Court first took on this issue in a serious way with a trilogy of 
cases decided in 1967.  Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 88 See Garrett, supra note 23, at 60 (of the first 200 postconviction DNA exonera-
tion cases, seventy-nine percent involved eyewitness error). 
 89 Wade, 388 U.S. 218. 
 90 Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263. 
 91 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).  Of the first 200 postconviction 
DNA exoneration cases, seventy-nine percent included eyewitness identifications that 
the DNA proved to be wrong.  Garrett, supra note 23, at 60.  Although we now know 
those identifications were mistaken, only forty-five percent of those wrongly identi-
fied individuals even attempted to challenge the admissibility of the eyewitness evi-
dence, and, of these, only four appellants brought claims alleging a violation of the 
right to counsel under Wade.  Id. at 77–80.  None of the challenges were successful.  
Id. 
 92 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 
(1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
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cided Wade and Gilbert—process cases relating to the right to counsel 
at identification procedures—the Court also held in Stovall v. Denno 
that police conduct might so seriously taint an identification that ad-
mission of the identification would violate due process.93  The Court 
held that admissibility of eyewitness testimony turned on whether po-
lice obtained the identification through procedures that were “so 
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken iden-
tification that [they violated the defendant’s right to] due process of 
law.”94  In other words, it appeared that the Court’s focus would be 
on whether the police had acted improperly—that is, whether police 
had employed unnecessarily suggestive procedures.  While the Court 
focused its analysis on police conduct that might produce an unreli-
able identification, it did not purport to assess directly the reliability 
of the identification itself.95
Subsequently, however, the Court expressly adopted a reliability-
centered analysis.  Beginning with Simmons v. United States,96 and then 
developed more fully in Neil v. Biggers97 and Manson v. Brathwaite,98 
the Court shifted its analysis in several ways.  First, instead of evaluat-
ing whether police employed an “unnecessarily” suggestive identifica-
tion procedure—a standard that inherently involves assessing 
whether police had other, less suggestive alternatives available—the 
Court said the test turns on whether police employed “impermissibly” 
suggestive procedures—a vaguer formulation that permits more 
flexibility for admitting dubious identification procedures.99  Second, 
the Court held that, even if police utilized impermissible suggestive-
ness, the identification might nonetheless be admissible if, under the 
totality of the circumstances, a court is satisfied that the identification 
is sufficiently reliable.100  In other words, even bad procedures—
highly suggestive police conduct—will be excused, so long as a court 
 93 The Court’s newfound right to counsel under Wade and Gilbert did not resolve 
the issue presented in Stovall because the Court concluded that the Wade right to 
counsel would not be applied retroactively.  Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296–301 
(1967). 
 94 Id. at 302. 
 95 See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with 
Pretrial Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 264 (1991) 
(noting that, in Stovall, “the Court did not consider whether the eyewitness’s pretrial 
or in-court identifications were reliable”). 
 96 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
 97 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 98 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 99 See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197; Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. 
 100 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197. 
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is satisfied that the resulting identification was reliable.  The Court 
expressly held that reliability, not process, is what matters. 
Unfortunately, the reliability test the Supreme Court created is 
deeply flawed and ineffectual.101  The Court instructed that, in evalu-
ating reliability, lower courts should assess five factors: (1) the oppor-
tunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) 
the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s 
prior description of the criminal; (4) the witness’s level of certainty; 
and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation.102  But re-
search has demonstrated that some of these factors—particularly cer-
tainty or confidence—are not significantly correlated to reliability.103  
And most of these factors are subjective assessments reported by the 
witness herself.  As such, any suggestiveness in the process infects not 
only the identification, but also the witness’s assessment of the very 
factors the courts consider to determine whether an identification is 
reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness.  The inherent circu-
larity of the test dooms it to failure.  The suggestiveness of the process 
leads most witnesses to be highly confident, to say they had a good 
opportunity to view, to say they paid attention to the criminal, and 
even to incorporate police-suggested aspects of the suspect’s appear-
ance into their descriptions of the perpetrators.  Thus, while the Su-
preme Court ostensibly employs a reliability analysis to protect inno-
cent defendants, the test in practice offers little protection.  Indeed, 
of the first 200 DNA exoneration cases, not a single one of these 
wrongful convictions was reversed on appeal based upon a challenge 
to eyewitness testimony under the Biggers and Brathwaite test, even 
though eyewitness evidence was presented in seventy-nine percent of 
the cases, and even though with the benefit of postconviction DNA 
testing, it is now known that every one of those identifications was 
wrong.104
 101 See Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: To-
wards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Proce-
dures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 122 (2006); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Evidence, Systemic 
Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 620–22. 
 102 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200. 
 103 Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Line-
ups and Photospreads, 22 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 14, 14–21 (1998); Gary L. Wells & A.L. 
Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports 
of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 360–76 (1998); Gary L. 
Wells et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness 
Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112–20 (2002). 
 104 Garrett, supra note 23, at 60. Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the Big-
gers/Brathwaite standard, a number of state courts are abandoning that test.  See, e.g., 
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Despite these specific areas in which courts have sometimes em-
braced, at least in theory if not in effect, some asymmetries necessary 
to give heightened protection to the innocent, other doctrines and 
practices pervert that hierarchy of values.  For example, while Su-
preme Court doctrine establishes that reliability is the touchstone of 
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony, the Court eschews 
reliability considerations when it comes to confession evidence.  For 
centuries, under both the common law and constitutional doctrine, 
reliability was an important consideration for courts when assessing 
the admissibility of an alleged confession.105  In Colorado v.  Connelly,106 
however, the Supreme Court changed course and declared that un-
der the due process voluntariness test, reliability is irrelevant.  In 
Connelly, a man suffering from psychotic delusions, in which God told 
him to confess to a murder or commit suicide, approached a police 
officer and confessed to a murder.  Although the statement appeared 
quite unreliable—indeed, police were unable to corroborate that the 
defendant’s murder confession referenced any actual murder—the 
Supreme Court held that, absent improper police coercion, the 
statement was not inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.  As 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: “A statement rendered 
by one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite 
unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws 
of the forum, and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”107
Thus, despite the Court’s declaration in the eyewitness identifi-
cation cases that due process is primarily concerned with reliability, 
and not with police conduct, in Connelly the Court held that, with re-
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 
1257 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981). 
 105 See Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 
623, 624 (2007); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and 
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 489.  Indeed, prior 
to the 1940s, reliability was all that really mattered. 
The first rules governing the admissibility of confessions were laid 
down in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a time when illegal 
police methods were relevant only insofar as they affected the trustwor-
thiness of the evidence.  Whatever the meaning of the elusive terms 
“involuntary” and “coerced” confessions since 1940, for centuries the 
rule that a confession was admissible so long as it was “voluntary” was 
more or less an alternative statement of the rule that a confession was 
admissible so long as it was free of influence which made it untrust-
worthy or “probably untrue.” 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 226 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). 
 106 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 107 Id. at 167 (citations omitted). 
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gard to confessions, reliability is irrelevant and all that matters is po-
lice conduct. 
2. Unbalanced Admissibility Standards and Practices 
Doctrine does nothing to guard against some other types of no-
toriously unreliable evidence that puts innocents at risk.  It has long 
been recognized, for example, that jailhouse informant or “snitch” 
testimony is among the most unreliable types of evidence because 
such informants are “incentivized”—they have every incentive to 
manufacture false testimony against an accused in hopes of obtaining 
benefits in their own cases.108  And, although one might think that 
the source of such testimony (a cellmate of dubious character) might 
be obviously unreliable, such testimony can be compelling nonethe-
less because informants can be convincing liars and because their tes-
timony almost always involves a claimed confession by the defen-
dant—a type of evidence that juries find persuasive.109  Indeed, 
research on wrongful convictions confirms that jailhouse informant 
testimony is a leading cause of wrongful convictions, present in eight-
een percent of the first 200 DNA exonerations.110  Yet, generally, 
there is no screening of jailhouse informant testimony for reliabil-
ity.111
 108 See generally ROB WARDEN, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW INCENTIVISED WITNESSES PUT 
38 INNOCENT AMERICANS ON DEATH ROW (2002); see also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: 
Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Infor-
mants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1419 (2007). 
 109 The Canadian inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow, for 
example, concluded that jailhouse informants are “polished and convincing liars,” 
that jurors give great weight to “confessions,” and that jurors give “the same weight to 
‘confessions’ made to jailhouse informants as they [do] to ‘confessions’ made to a 
police officer.”  PROVINCE OF MANITOBA, MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING 
THOMAS SOPHONOW, JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS, THEIR UNRELIABILITY AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETE CROWN DISCLOSURE PERTAINING TO THEM, available at http: 
//www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/jailhouse/what.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2008). 
 110 Garrett, supra note 23, at 86.  According to the Center on Wrongful Convic-
tions, jailhouse snitch testimony also played a role in 45.9% of the first 111 exonera-
tions of individuals who had been sentenced to death.  NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM 3 (2004–
2005), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 111 Garrett, supra note 23, at 88.  “Illinois, after experiencing heightened numbers 
of exonerations, is now the only state to require that trial courts conduct reliability 
hearings to evaluate jailhouse informants.”  Id. (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-
21(c) (2003)).  A panel of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals also briefly experimented 
with a requirement for pretrial reliability hearings related to informant testimony, 
but the en banc court quickly vacated that requirement.  Dodd v. State, No. F-97-26, 
1999 WL 521976, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. Jul. 22, 1999), vacated and reh’g granted, 993 
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Courts also routinely admit other evidence of dubious reliability, 
including social science or “syndrome” evidence that should not pass 
serious Daubert scrutiny.112  Rape trauma syndrome (RTS) evidence, 
for example, is frequently introduced by prosecutors to suggest that 
the victim behaved in a way consistent with the manner in which a 
rape victim might behave.  Janet Hoeffel has noted, however, that the 
syndrome is so broad and accommodates such a wide spectrum of 
behaviors that it “would seem to leave the only commonality among 
the victims their self-expressed report of rape.”113  Hoeffel contends 
that, “[w]ere RTS to be substantively analyzed under Daubert, it would 
not pass the test.  Research . . . has borne out that there is no identifi-
able and predictable set of behaviors which describe a rape victim.”114  
Most courts have simply failed to analyze the reliability or scientific 
foundations of the syndrome, instead admitting the evidence by rely-
ing on the decisions of other courts accepting the syndrome.115
Defendants also have the benefit of lax admissibility standards 
for some social science evidence, such as evidence on Battered 
Woman Syndrome (BWS).  Hoeffel, among others, argues that BWS, 
like RTS, is not well-grounded in research.116  She notes that BWS evi-
dence, like RTS evidence, is routinely admitted in American courts, 
even though under any serious analysis it cannot clear the Daubert 
gate.117  But, Hoeffel contends, BWS is the exception for defense ex-
P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); see Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How 
Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 114 (2006) 
(proposing a model statute requiring pre-trial evaluations of informant testimony). 
 112 Risinger, supra note 12, at 134.  
 113 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 51. 
 114 Id. at 55. 
 115 Id. at 54. 
 116 Id. at 43–56; see also Regina Schuller & Sara Rzepa, The Scientific Status of Re-
search on Domestic Violence Against Women, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 43–47 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002) [here-
inafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]. 
 117 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 43–56.  Hoeffel observes that “to date no court has 
earnestly evaluated the scientific validity of BWS.”  Id. at 47.  Applying the Daubert fac-
tors, Hoeffel notes that (1) BWS has never been scientifically tested; (2) BWS has not 
for the most part been subjected to peer review and publication, but rather has been 
printed in the popular press; (3) the error rate has never been determined; and (4) 
courts assessing whether the syndrome is “generally accepted” in the relevant field 
have “defin[ed] the field narrowly to those who study battered women, as opposed to 
social scientists or psychologists generally.”  Id. at 48–50.  In the end, Hoeffel con-
cludes that “[t]he argument for admissibility on political grounds is an appealing 
one,” but that its admissibility across the board cannot be justified under sound evi-
dence law principles.  Id. at 50.  Rather, she contends it should only be admissible 
when proffered by the defendant, despite lack of standing under Daubert, because of 
the defendant’s unique constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence, to 
present a defense, and to voice.  Id. 
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pert evidence, which can be explained by political considerations: the 
BWS defense benefits a sympathetic, politically significant portion of 
the population—women who have been abused.118  By contrast, Hoef-
fel notes that other social science syndrome evidence that might be 
used by criminal defendants and which stands on a scientific footing 
similar to BWS, but that would generally apply to much more politi-
cally disfavored and disenfranchised groups—inner-city African-
American men—has “barely [seen] the light of day.”119  Such syn-
drome evidence, including Urban Psychosis, Urban Survival Syn-
drome, or Black Rage theory, could be used to “explain why a defen-
dant believed he was facing imminent bodily harm from another 
young African-American man who had his back to him across a court-
yard,”120 or in the case of Black Rage theory to explain “an uncontrol-
lable rage precipitated by racism and unequal treatment.”121  Such 
evidence, she argues, has been excluded not because of its faulty sci-
entific underpinnings, but because it would apply broadly and apoca-
lyptically to vast percentages of criminal defendants, and because, 
“[w]hile battered women are easily viewed as victims, young African-
American men living in a world of violence are not.”122  In sum, there-
fore, she contends that social science evidence is frequently admitted 
in an asymmetrical manner—but in a manner that usually disfavors 
criminal defendants based upon political considerations.123
D. Michael Risinger’s analysis of Daubert cases found similarly 
that, “[w]hen it comes to ‘summarizational’ or ‘educational’ exper-
tise, prosecution witnesses almost always are allowed to testify, and 
defense witnesses are rejected in a majority of cases.”124  Prosecutors 
typically introduce modus operandi witnesses (typically police officers 
who testify from their experience concerning the general way crimi-
Hoeffel contends that the real reason that BWS has been accepted by the courts 
is that it is generally offered by a politically sympathetic segment of society—abused 
women—and thus it is an exception in the world of criminal defense evidence.  Id. at 
71. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 69. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 70 (quoting Deborah L. Goldklang, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
and Black Rage: Clinical Validity, Criminal Responsibility, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 213, 216 
(1997) (arguing that Black Rage meets the criteria for PTSD)). 
 122 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 71. 
 123 Id. at 78–79.  Hoeffel has argued that, in light of this constitutional preference 
for protecting against convicting the innocent, “all reasonable doubts about the reli-
ability of social science evidence in criminal cases [should] be resolved in favor of the 
accused—not the cause, person, or matter which society deems politically prefer-
able.”  Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 42. 
 124 Risinger, supra note 12, at 131–32 (footnote omitted). 
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nal schemes operate and the usual meaning of criminal slang and 
code words).  Defendants typically introduce eyewitness identification 
experts.  The former are almost always allowed, the latter less fre-
quently.125
Consistent with this observation, Christopher Slobogin has ar-
gued that the heightened reliability scrutiny of Daubert will actually be 
detrimental to criminal defendants and will make the system less fair 
and reliable because the type of experts that the defense tends to rely 
upon will have a harder time passing Daubert scrutiny than will prose-
cutors’ experts, even though the defense evidence is important to a 
search for the truth.126  The defense, he points out, typically presents 
experts involving claims about mental state, “such as insanity, lack of 
premeditation, extreme mental or emotional stress, or learned help-
lessness.”127  The prosecution, on the other hand, he says, “only needs 
experts on mental state issues if and when the defense decides to use 
a mental health professional.”128  But such social science evidence, he 
says, will have a harder time passing Daubert analysis than other scien-
tific or expert evidence because mental states are inherently more 
difficult to prove than are questions about past acts; they “are closer 
to social constructions than objective facts.”129  In his recent book, 
Proving the Unprovable, Slobogin lays out a compelling argument for 
more lenient admissibility of defense state-of-mind evidence, as a 
matter of fairness and necessity.130
As these commentators note, courts do restrict significant de-
fense evidence in ways that undermine the search for the truth.  De-
fendants have long sought, for example, to introduce expert eyewit-
ness identification evidence to address a wide variety of counter-
intuitive features of human perception and memory that juries need 
to understand when evaluating eyewitness testimony.131  While courts 
 125 Id. at 132. 
 126 Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 105, 109 (2003). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 109–10. 
 129 Id. at 110. 
 130 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 39–40.  To compensate for its inherent unprovabil-
ity, Slobogin offers a rule of admissibility that he calls “generally accepted content 
validity,” which would provide meaningful standards for reviewing state-of-mind ex-
pert evidence without unduly limiting its admissibility.  Id. at 62. 
 131 For a valuable history of the attempts to use psychology to inform the law’s un-
derstanding of eyewitnesses, see JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, 
SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION (2004). 
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recently have become somewhat more receptive to such testimony,132 
by and large courts considering the admissibility of eyewitness reli-
ability expertise have excluded it.133  Yet, of all the social sciences, ex-
pertise on eyewitness fallibility is some of the most rigorously tested 
and scientific; it “is an example of how ‘soft science’ can be ‘good sci-
ence.’”134  It has been subjected to decades of laboratory tests and 
some field research.  As others have concluded, a strict Daubert analy-
sis would lead to admitting expert witness testimony on eyewitness 
identifications.135  Nonetheless, most courts still reject the testimony, 
although typically for reasons other than reliability136—such as mis-
 132 See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 786 
F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1984), 
overruled on other grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265, 278 (Cal. 2000); State v. 
Dubray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003); State v. Shomberg, 709 N.W.2d 370, 376 
(Wis. 2006) (upholding exclusion of expert testimony, but noting that, “were this 
case to come before the circuit court today, given the developments that have oc-
curred in the interim [including expanding judicial understanding of the research], 
it is highly likely that the judge would have allowed the expert to testify on factors 
that influence identification and memory”). 
 133 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1326. 
[A] review of the case law shows that the overwhelming majority of 
courts considering the admissibility of eyewitness reliability expertise 
have excluded it from trial.  Of the federal courts of appeals, seven cir-
cuits have upheld the exclusion of eyewitness identification expert tes-
timony, and only two circuits have upheld the admission of the testi-
mony.  Of the state court decisions since Daubert, all eighteen states 
considering the evidence have upheld its exclusion. 
Id. at 1329 (citations and footnotes omitted); SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 30. 
 134 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 64 (citing Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological 
Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and Sci-
ence, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 229, 256 (1995); Wells et al., supra note 103, at 604. 
 135 See United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he science 
of eyewitness perception has achieved the level of exactness, methodology, and reli-
ability of any psychological research.” (internal quotations omitted)); Peter J. Cohen, 
How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness 
Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 276–78 (1996) (arguing that expertise on eyewit-
ness errors passes Daubert because it is testable and has been tested extensively; the 
data has been subjected to extensive publication and peer review; while the error 
rate of the research itself may not be discoverable, the research has demonstrated a 
high rate of error in eyewitness testimony; and the expertise has gained general ac-
ceptance in the relevant scientific community); Hoeffel,  supra note 1, at 1331. 
 136 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1325 (“The judicial decisions on the admission of 
eyewitness reliability expertise represent an example of . . . irrationality.  Of the myr-
iad forms of social science evidence which have entered through the courtroom 
doors, perhaps the most well-researched of those is expertise on eyewitness reliabil-
ity.”); Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 64 (citing Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on 
Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 
1032 (1995)). 
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placed concerns that it will invade the province of the jury,137 or that 
it provides nothing beyond the ken of ordinary people,138 or because 
it is not based specifically on the facts of the given case or contact 
with the eyewitness involved.139
Courts are even less receptive to other sorts of expert testimony, 
such as expert testimony about false confessions.  Confession evi-
dence is some of the most powerful evidence that can be offered 
against a criminal defendant because people commonly believe that 
if a person confessed, he must be guilty.140  It is truly counter-intuitive 
to believe that a person would confess to a crime he did not commit, 
especially a heinous violent crime.  But the postconviction DNA ex-
onerations prove that people do indeed confess falsely and for a vari-
ety of reasons.  Of the first 200 postconviction DNA exoneration 
cases, sixteen percent involved a false confession.141  Defense exper-
tise can be important in helping jurors understand not only that false 
confessions do occur, but also the factors that can lead a person to 
confess falsely.142  False confession theory has been subjected to study, 
although not nearly as much study as eyewitness fallibility.143  Janet 
Hoeffel concludes that “[f]alse confession theory appears to have a 
 137 Research consistently demonstrates that expert testimony on eyewitness fallibil-
ity does not overwhelm jurors or make them too unwilling to accept eyewitness iden-
tifications, but rather helps them better understand such testimony.  See Steven Pen-
rod & Brian Cutler, Preventing Mistaken Convictions in Eyewitness Identification Trials: 
The Case Against Traditional Safeguards, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE 89, 114 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina 
Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 133, 173 (1989). 
 138 Research also demonstrates that lay people, including jurors and judges, har-
bor significant misconceptions about human memory and perception; expertise does 
indeed provide information that is counter-intuitive and therefore beyond the ken or 
ordinary jurors.  See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 137, at 114; Richard A. Wise & Mar-
tin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 432 (2004). 
 139 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 30.  Slobogin notes that this makes little sense, as 
this evidence is “social framework evidence par excellence.”  Id.  He elaborates that 
“[s]imply because information is general does not make it irrelevant to an individual 
situation.”  Id. at 36.  Indeed, many courts limit such testimony to such nomothetic 
evidence, as opposed to case-specific, idiopathic testimony.  Id. 
 140 Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of 
the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 33, 56–58 (2004); Richard A. 
Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, su-
pra note 47, at 36. 
 141 Garrett, supra note 23, at 60. 
 142 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 66. 
 143 For a summary of much of the false confession research literature, see Leo et 
al., supra note 105, at 514–20. 
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reliability level on par with BWS or RTS.”144  Yet most courts have dis-
allowed false confession expert testimony, even though they admit 
BWS and RTS testimony.145
Perhaps even more troubling from the perspective of concern 
for protecting the innocent are doctrinal rules that expressly embrace 
limitations on the defendant’s ability to present a defense.  Most no-
table in this regard is the direct connection doctrine, or its variants, 
which imposes significant limitations on the ability of defendants to 
introduce evidence of alternate or third-party suspects.146  Third-party 
perpetrator evidence is not admissible in most jurisdictions merely if 
it is relevant.  Rather, under the direct connection doctrine, the evi-
dence must be both relevant in the traditional sense (i.e., it must 
have a “tendency” to make the defendant’s guilt “less probable”147), 
and it must have a “direct connection” to the crime.148  The rule fre-
quently excludes evidence of strong motive or opportunity because 
courts often require “direct evidence placing the third party at the 
scene.”149  Because this rule imposes a super-relevancy requirement 
 144 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 66.  Although false confession testimony is generally 
accepted in the relevant scientific community, some argue that more research is 
needed before it can meet the Daubert standards for admissibility.  See Major James R. 
Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1999, at 
26, 39–43. 
 145 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 67.  In one notable exception, in which real doubts 
about the defendant’s guilt existed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that the lower court misapplied Daubert in disallowing false confession testimony 
and remanded for consideration under the proper standards.  United States v. Hall, 
93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 146 Different jurisdictions use different terminology to describe the direct connec-
tion requirement, including “clearly link,” “point directly,” “point unerringly,” “in-
herent tendency,” or “legitimate tendency,” but all essentially have the same effect.  
See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 343 n.337. 
 147 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 148 See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 342–45, 355–65; David McCord, “But Perry 
Mason Made It Look So Easy!”: The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant 
to Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REV. 917, 921 (1996); Ellen Yankiver 
Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in 
Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1675 (2000).   
 149 State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Minn. 1999).  The United States Su-
preme Court recently invalidated one of the most onerous versions of this rule.  
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).  In Holmes, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court had held that a defendant may not introduce proof of third-party guilt 
if the prosecution had introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly sup-
ported a guilty verdict.  Id. at 323–24.  While acknowledging the widely accepted 
general limitations on third-party-perpetrator evidence, the Court held that South 
Carolina’s variation of the rule went too far and violated the defendant's constitu-
tional right to present a defense.  Id. at 329–31.  The Court noted that, under South 
Carolina’s rule, if the prosecution appeared to have a strong case, no third-party guilt 
evidence, no matter how powerful or direct, was admissible.  Id.  This, the Court said, 
FINDLEY_FINAL_V2 6/12/2008  11:27:07 AM 
926 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:893 
 
on the defendant’s ability to tell her story of innocence, it is hard to 
reconcile the rule with a professed overriding concern for protecting 
the innocent.150
Similarly, the statements against penal interest exception to the 
hearsay rule asymmetrically burdens defense evidence of innocence.  
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 creates a hearsay exception for state-
ments against penal interest if the declarant was unavailable at the 
time of trial.151  The rule, however, uniquely disfavors such evidence 
when offered by criminal defendants to show that someone else 
might have committed the crime.  The rule provides: “A statement 
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”152  The 
rule does not similarly burden such evidence when offered by the 
prosecution in a criminal case, or when offered by any party in a civil 
action.  Again, such skewing of admissibility standards is hard to rec-
oncile with an overriding commitment to protecting the innocent.153
Eleanor Swift has also shown, in her contribution to this sympo-
sium, that courts apply disparate standards of admissibility for “con-
textual” evidence offered to complete the narratives presented by the 
parties.  Drawing on narrative relevance, the story model of trial, and 
the relative plausibility theory of jury decision-making, she notes the 
importance of context-rich information to a party’s ability to con-
vince a jury of the truthfulness of his story, of his version of the 
truth.154  She notes that the Supreme Court, in Old Chief v. United 
“does not rationally serve the end that the [direct connection doctrine was] designed 
to promote, i.e., to focus the trial on the central issues by excluding evidence that has 
only a very weak logical connection to the central issues.”  Id. at 330.  The Court was 
also troubled by the asymmetry created by the South Carolina rule: “The rule applied 
in this case is no more logical than its converse would be, i.e., a rule barring the 
prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant is able 
to proffer, at a pretrial hearing, evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a verdict 
of not guilty.”  Id. at 330. 
 150 See Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 355–65. 
 151 FED. R. EVID. 804(a), (b)(3). 
 152 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 153 See James Joseph Duane, The Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 
608(b) and 8804(b)(3): Two Great Ideas that Don’t Go Far Enough, 209 F.R.D. 235, 244–48 
(2002); Findley & Scott, supra note 9, at 345–46, 355–65 (explaining that the rule is 
based on distrust of defense exculpatory evidence, and arguing that such distrust is 
misplaced); Peter W. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Applica-
tion, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 
978–1011 (1981); Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay 
from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1113–28 (1987). 
 154 Swift, supra note 58. 
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States,155 implicitly acknowledged “the narrative theory of decision 
making that underlies the story model”—at least when offered by the 
prosecution.  She notes that Old Chief “places the Court’s imprimatur 
on the prosecution’s ability to use evidence of ‘guiltiness,’ not just of 
‘guilt,’ in order to help ‘tell an involving and coherent story’”156—a 
development that others, such as Michael Risinger, have decried as 
permitting prejudicial “heartstrings and gore” evidence to infect the 
trial on questions of guilt.157  But Swift shows that such context evi-
dence is not admitted evenly.  In particular, she demonstrates how 
courts tend to apply the state-of-mind hearsay exception under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(3)158 to exclude defendants’ statements 
about their then-existing state of mind, even though such evidence 
should be admissible under Rule 803(3), and even though it may be 
critical context information needed to make a defendant’s narrative 
complete and plausible.159
Finally, some rules that put innocents at risk do so not by exclud-
ing defense evidence outright, but by burdening its introduction.  For 
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which permits cross-
examination of a testifying defendant about her prior record, can 
prevent even an innocent defendant from taking the stand to tell the 
truth.160  Accordingly, John Blume has argued that, because the cur-
rent legal regime discourages even factually innocent defendants 
from telling their (true) stories at trial, the law should be changed.161  
He argues that only prior convictions for perjury should be poten-
tially available for impeachment purposes.162
 155 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 156 Swift, supra note 58.  Old Chief holds that it was error, in a trial for assault with a 
dangerous weapon and felon in possession of a firearm, to allow the prosecution to 
present evidence about the nature of the defendant’s prior conviction, rather than to 
accept his stipulation that he had a prior felony conviction.  But in the course of so 
holding, the Court also declared that, in other circumstances, context evidence 
might be admissible “not just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance, 
and so to implicate the law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in 
judgment.”  519 U.S. at 187–88.  The Court embraced evidence that seeks “as much 
to tell a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors 
that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable.”  Id. at 188. 
 157 Risinger, supra note 1, at 1307. 
 158 FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (creating a hearsay exception for statement about “[t]hen 
existing mental, emotional, or physical condition”). 
 159 Swift, supra note 58. 
 160 John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. (forthcoming 2008), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1014181.   
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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In sum, these admissibility patterns are perverse, at least if we 
take seriously our professed commitment to protecting the innocent 
as a highest-order value.  While the system is not and cannot be sym-
metrical, it turns out that ours is asymmetrical in ways that compro-
mise our commitment to protecting the innocent.  But given the con-
stitution’s preference for giving voice and protection to criminal 
defendants, any asymmetry in admissibility should favor the defense, 
not the prosecution.163  Hoeffel, for example, argues that psychologi-
cal syndrome evidence such as BWS and RTS should generally be sub-
jected to rigorous admissibility analysis under Daubert when offered by 
the prosecution, but that it should be more freely admitted when of-
fered by the defense, in recognition of the defendant’s constitutional 
right to present a defense.164  Similarly, Slobogin contends  that 
criminal defendants should have greater leeway in introducing de-
fensive state-of-mind evidence: “[T]he criminal defendant, the party 
most likely to use mental health professionals to support culpability 
claims, has a special entitlement to voice, stemming from both consti-
tutional and procedural justice principles.  That entitlement . . . 
should trump concerns about scientific reliability.”165 Moreover, a 
number of scholars have argued cogently that there should be even 
greater leeway for defense experts on matters such as eyewitness falli-
bility, false confessions, and states of mind—matters that are all 
 163 Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Crimi-
nal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 100, 113–17 
(1999). 
 164 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 78.  Hoeffel argues that 
[w]hen faced with proffers of social science evidence on behalf of de-
fendants, the courts must [apply right-to-present-a-defense principles] 
and admit the evidence, even if it is not Daubert-reliable, as long as it 
does not rise to such a level of untrustworthiness that the traditional 
tools of advocacy—cross-examination and hiring a prosecution expert 
for rebuttal are ineffective. 
Id.  But, she contends, “the courts must hold the prosecution’s evidence up to 
Daubert’s light and engage in the honest assessments of the reliability of evidence that 
they have been avoiding.”  Id. at 79.  Hoeffel notes that other commentators have 
similarly proposed such differing burdens of proof for the defense and prosecution.  
Id. at 79 n.235 (citing Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye 
v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1248 (1980); David 
McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 105–06 (1987); 
Slobogin, supra note 163, at 113; Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice 
Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 117–19 (1993)). 
 165 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 40. 
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counter-intuitive—because such counter-intuitive information is par-
ticularly needed by and helpful to juries.166
As things stand, however, criminal defendants are handicapped 
not only by their ability to generate their own evidence, but also by 
rules that fail to protect them from unreliable prosecution evidence 
and rules that burden their ability to present exculpatory evidence.  
And, as Part III will demonstrate, this asymmetry in the criminal jus-
tice system is particularly pronounced where forensic science evi-
dence is concerned. 
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 
A. Adversary Failure 
Forensic sciences have proven to be an especially difficult field 
for criminal defendants.  For a variety of reasons, the way the criminal 
justice system handles forensic science evidence puts innocents at 
risk. 
Considerable judicial and scholarly attention has been focused 
on problems attendant to the “battle of the experts” in civil litiga-
tion.167  Regardless of how serious those problems might be in civil 
cases, at least in that arena there is a real “battle” between competing 
forces, which is essential to the proper functioning of the adversary 
system.  Although not always true, in civil cases both adversaries fre-
quently bring ample resources and a cadre of well-compensated ex-
perts to a relatively balanced playing field.168  But in criminal cases, 
where the stakes are so much higher, there often is no serious adver-
sary testing of forensic sciences.  Typically, the field is anything but 
level.169
As suggested above, the government has significantly greater ac-
cess to forensic science services and experts than do most criminal 
defendants.  Crime laboratories exist to provide such services to 
 166 Id. at 79 (“[P]robative testimony tending to support an insanity, provocation, 
or lack of mens rea defense ought to be considered helpful because it rebuts legal 
and lay preconceptions about mental state.”); Risinger, supra note 1, at 1313. 
 167 See generally Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): Contempo-
rary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1999); Richard H. Un-
derwood, “X-Spurt” Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 343 (1995). 
 168 See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM (1991); see also Risinger, supra note 1, at 1310. 
 169 Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2003) (“Instead of worrying about the ‘hired gun’ phenomenon 
as in civil litigation, the criminal defense lawyer often lacks money for any ‘gun.’”). 
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prosecutors; no corresponding institutions exist for defendants.170  
And, because most defendants are indigent, their ability to hire ex-
perts is dependent on public funding of legal services to the indigent, 
which is abysmally inadequate in virtually every jurisdiction.171  Be-
cause funding for indigent defense is so inadequate, defense services 
are rationed in ways that put innocents at risk; rationing disfavors ex-
pensive, substantive innocence claims (such as expensive litigation 
about the validity of forensic evidence), and instead favors more in-
expensive procedural constitutional claims.172  While the Supreme 
Court in Ake v. Oklahoma173 recognized a constitutional right to pub-
licly funded experts for the indigent, exercise of that right is depend-
ent on the willingness of a local judge to order the expenditure of 
scarce local resources, and on a cumbersome case-by-case, expert-by-
expert process for requesting funding.  Any risk of failure of that 
case-by-case process to provide adequate expert services falls on the 
defendant, and courts have tended to apply Ake narrowly.174  That sys-
 170 Indeed, a survey in 1985 revealed that seventy-nine percent of all laboratories 
were “located within law enforcement/public safety agencies.”  Joseph L. Peterson et 
al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation’s Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985); see Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 
J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 118 (1993) (while “[o]btaining expert assistance is 
generally not a problem for the prosecution, which has access to the services of state, 
county, or metropolitan crime laboratories . . . [f]orensic laboratory services . . . are 
not generally available to criminal defendants”). 
 171 See Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra 
note 47, at 220, 226; Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for 
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994); Brown, supra 
note 24, at 1590 (noting that, because “defense counsel’s commitment is not to accu-
racy; it is to his or her clients, many of whom want inaccuracy to mask their guilt,” 
“[l]egislatures . . . have responded to Court mandates for defense counsel by consis-
tently underfunding defenders in order to constrain their effectiveness”). 
 172 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1997). 
 173 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 174 See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1095 (quoting STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL 
J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 2000) (“Generally speaking the 
courts have read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an expert 
unless it is absolutely essential to the defense.”)); Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, 
When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262 SCI. AM. 46, 50 (1990) (noting DNA cases in 
which the defense did not retain any experts “because the presiding judge had re-
fused to authorize funds”); see also JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND 
INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 202 (2006) (describing how an Oklahoma trial court de-
nied Ron Williamson’s request for an expert to assist his defense, despite his pressing 
need for such assistance; Williamson was convicted and sentenced to death, only to 
be exonerated by DNA testing years later). 
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tem comes nowhere close to providing the level of forensic sciences 
assistance that is needed, or that is available to the prosecution.175
A corollary, and perhaps in part an outgrowth, of that system is 
that prosecutors have the ability to organize themselves into special 
units with expertise in various forensic sciences.  A particular prose-
cutor or unit of prosecutors, at least in larger jurisdictions or in State 
Justice Departments that can assist smaller local prosecutors’ offices, 
can become expert, for example, in DNA analysis or other types of 
scientific evidence.176  Then, when a case with significant scientific 
evidence in those areas arises, those prosecutors are assigned to 
prosecute or assist local prosecutors in those cases. 
The defense bar is not similarly organized.  Most defense lawyers 
operate on their own, with little assistance from any other lawyers 
(except in capital cases, where it is common to have two or sometimes 
more attorneys assigned).  Typically, the lawyers are assigned or hired 
to take whatever cases arise, without regard to specialized expertise.  
Public defender services in many states are not organized beyond the 
county level, and appointments are still made in many jurisdictions by 
local courts.177  Even in states with organized statewide public de-
fender services, the kind of organization that prosecutors bring to 
bear is unusual.  Simply put, “[p]rosecutors are much better at shar-
ing information than defense attorneys[, in part] because the gov-
ernment is by its nature a more coherent entity than the defense bar, 
but . . . also because the state is better able to anticipate the scientific 
issues that will arise and act accordingly.”178
Without organized assistance, the defense bar as a whole is gen-
erally unprepared to utilize or challenge scientific evidence ade-
quately.  Most lawyers have no training or experience in the sciences 
and are naturally intimidated and overwhelmed by scientific evi-
 175 See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535, 539 (2005) (de-
scribing the inadequacy of defense expert funding under federal statutory schemes 
and Ake). 
 176 For an example of some of a prosecutor’s trailblazing work with DNA, see DNA 
Links Prisoner to Death 18 Years Ago: Homicide Charges Filed in Milwaukee Cold-Case Slay-
ing, WIS. ST. J., Jan. 29, 2008, at B5.  In Wisconsin, for example, Milwaukee County 
Assistant District Attorney Norm Gahn has become the state’s acknowledged expert 
in DNA evidence.  Id.  Gahn has served on former Attorney General Janet Reno’s Na-
tional Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, and pioneered innovative uses of 
DNA in criminal prosecutions.  Id.  When high-profile and complicated DNA prose-
cutions have arisen, anywhere in the State, Gahn has been called in to assist in the 
prosecution.  Id. 
 177 Bernhard, supra note 171, at 227. 
 178 Slobogin, supra note 126, at 117. 
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dence.179  As a consequence, until recently most of the forensic sci-
ences utilized by prosecutors were rarely challenged by defense law-
yers, but were merely accepted as good science, whose results were 
presumed valid.180
In Daubert, and subsequently in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,181 and 
then Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court provided a new framework for 
screening scientific and expert evidence, which appeared to promise 
rigorous scrutiny of the forensic sciences.  Daubert broke dramatically 
from the admissibility standard that had been established in Frye v. 
United States.182  Under Frye, courts admitted scientific evidence if it 
was “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field.183  Frye essen-
tially deferred questions of reliability and scientific validity to the sci-
entists who were proponents or practitioners in that particular scien-
tific or technical field.184  Frye was criticized because it admitted “bad” 
science—“junk science”185—by allowing scientists to “self-validate” 
their own fields, while at the same time excluding some “good” sci-
ence simply if it was too new to have gained general acceptance.186  
 179 See ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 7 (3d ed. 
1986) (“[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, 
which ill equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility 
of evidence proffered through expert witnesses.”); Jonakait, supra note 5, at 348, 349 
(noting that, even with an experienced and respected defense lawyer, “when it came 
to the scientific and mathematical testimony, the adversary system ceased to exist and 
the evidence was not challenged,” and that, “[p]erhaps as a group, attorneys are rea-
sonably bright people who became lawyers partly because they were afraid of science 
and math”). 
 180 Nearly twenty years ago Peter Neufeld and Neville Colman observed that, be-
cause they lack an adequate scientific background, “lawyers rarely do more than re-
view the qualifications of the expert (typically based on perfunctory queries about 
institutional affiliation and publications) and verify the facts on which the expert’s 
conclusions are based.”  Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 49; see also id. at 52 
(describing how, when DNA was first used in criminal prosecutions, defense attor-
neys almost always “failed to obtain the raw population data on which conclusions 
about allele frequencies were predicated,” “failed to present any expert witnesses” of 
their own, and engaged in only “perfunctory” cross-examination of the prosecution’s 
experts). 
 181 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 182 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 183 Id. at 1014. 
 184 Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evi-
dence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 230 (2000) (“Frye-like tests allowed judges to piggy-back 
their decisions onto someone else’s judgment of whether the proffered evidence was 
sufficiently valid to be admitted.”). 
 185 See HUBER, supra note 168, at 14–15 (1993).  But see generally Gary Edmond & 
David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science”, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (criticizing the 
“junk science” argument). 
 186 See Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1319.  Michael Saks has observed that “the Frye test 
suffers from a special paradox: because less rigorous fields will reach a state of ‘gen-
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Daubert changed that; under Daubert, “[j]udges, and not scientists, 
would now be the ‘gatekeepers’ of scientific evidence.”187  Daubert in-
structs judges to scrutinize the reliability188 of the scientific or techni-
cal evidence instead of deferring to the general acceptance of the sci-
entists.189  To undertake this gatekeeping role, Daubert says, courts are 
to apply a flexible approach, which should include consideration of 
four factors in particular: whether the theory or technique can be 
and has been tested; whether the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; the technique’s known or po-
tential error rate; and whether the theory or technique is generally 
accepted in the relevant field (the Frye element).190  These are the 
tools, the Supreme Court instructs, that lawyers and courts should 
rigorously apply to screen scientific and technical evidence for reli-
ability. 
eral acceptance’ more readily than more rigorous fields, courts employing Frye will 
more readily admit the offerings of less dependable fields and less readily admit the 
offerings of more dependable fields.”  Saks, supra note 184, at 231. 
 187 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1320. 
 188 In scientific terms, “reliability” refers to a scientific test’s consistency, that is, its 
ability to replicate its results in repeated examinations, while “validity” refers to a 
test’s accuracy, that is, its ability to measure what it claims to measure.  See 1 MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 116, at § 4-2.3; Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: 
Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 911 (1998).  Daubert generally uses “reliability” to 
include what in scientific terms would be considered both “reliability” and “validity.”  
See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans 
that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1068 
(2001).  In this Article, I use “reliability” in the lay sense as it is used in Daubert, to in-
clude both scientific validity and reliability. 
 189 To be sure, Daubert was viewed initially and in part as loosening the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence because it would permit courts to admit new scientific theo-
ries or techniques before they could be said to have obtained “general acceptance.”  
See Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1317–18, 1318 n.233.  Hoeffel notes that, in Daubert, the 
Court stated that “a rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement would be at odds with 
the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony.’”  Id. at 1318 n.233 (quoting Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)).  But Daubert also promised to im-
pose more searching judicial scrutiny of scientific reliability, by shifting the gatekeep-
ing role to the courts.  Id. at 1320.  And by the time the Court had decided Joiner and 
Kumho Tire, the Court had clearly signaled that it was “moving from a liberal standard 
of admissibility as suggested in Daubert, to an exacting standard.”  Giannelli, supra 
note 170, at 1080; see also David L. Faigmen, et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert 
Evidence under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 656 (2000) (noting 
that Daubert generally raised the height of the admissibility bar, but that it is more 
liberal than Frye “when the expert evidence is solid, but on the cutting edge, and 
therefore not generally accepted”).  By the time the Court decided Weisgram v. Marley 
Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), the Court said that Daubert imposed “exacting standards of 
reliability.”  Id. at 455. 
 190 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
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That rigorous screening, however, has not materialized with re-
spect to forensic science evidence offered by the prosecution in 
criminal cases.  “Fingerprints, handwriting comparison, microscopic 
hair analysis, fiber analysis, ballistics, arson investigations, forensic 
odontology—indeed most of the forensic sciences—have become fix-
tures in criminal cases, and until recently their reliability, objectivity, 
and claim to scientific foundation—and hence admissibility—have 
scarcely been the subject of inquiry.”191  Peter Neufeld has observed 
that Daubert’s promise of rigorous screening for scientific reliability 
has not materialized in criminal cases because defense lawyers rarely 
raise serious Daubert challenges to the prosecution’s forensic science 
evidence.192  Empirical data confirms that little adversary testing of 
scientific evidence or experts is offered in criminal cases, both in the 
United States and Great Britain.193
Yet many commentators have noted that much of the forensic 
science evidence used to obtain convictions is of dubious scientific va-
lidity and would not pass scrutiny if Daubert were applied rigorously.194  
Proficiency testing of the forensic individualization sciences (those 
that purport to match an individual to a piece of evidence) consis-
 191 Keith A. Findley, The Pedagogy of Innocence: Reflections on the Role of Innocence Pro-
jects in Legal Education, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 245 (2006); see Michael J. Saks & 
Jonathan Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 
892, 892–94 (2005). 
 192 Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107–10. 
 193 Risinger, supra note 12, at 135; Lois Rogers, The Expert as Judge and Jury, TIMES 
ONLINE, Nov. 18, 2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article 
2889323.ece (“A study by senior barrister Penny Cooper of City University in Lon-
don, has shown that the majority of lawyers and judges do not bother to check the 
qualifications of experts they approach to bolster an aspect of their case.”). 
 194 See, e.g., Saks, supra note 184, at 237–40 (2000); ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, 
EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL 
DUE PROCESS 94–95 (2007) (“Many time-honored methods of criminal identification, 
such as hair analysis, voice spectography, and bitemark identification, to name a few, 
have turned out to have no better foundation than ancient divination rituals.”).  As 
Randolph Jonakait has explained, 
little or no meaningful testing has ever been performed on many fo-
rensic science procedures.  Little is also known about the true error 
rates for almost all forensic science techniques.  The few disclosed er-
ror rates, however, are shockingly high.  Most forensic science operates 
outside of the peer review systems, and forensic science is seldom pub-
lished.  While forensic science techniques are accepted in forensic sci-
ence, many are not accepted by a broader scientific community.  Fur-
thermore, the techniques accepted in forensic science are not used in 
such a way that would reveal their methodological flaws, if any. 
     In other words, if Daubert is taken seriously, then much of forensic 
science is in serious trouble. 
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Forensic Sci-
ence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2103, 2117 (1994) (footnotes omitted). 
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tently shows alarmingly high error rates.195  One glimpse of the prob-
lem is revealed by the fact that use of fraudulent, mistaken, or mis-
leading forensic science contributed to fifty-five percent of the first 
200 DNA exonerations.196  As others have pointed out, hair micros-
copy has little scientific basis and has been exposed as wrong by DNA 
testing of the examined hairs in a significant percentage of cases.197  
Serology tests, even though themselves usually reliable, have been 
misused in many wrongful conviction cases (serology evidence was 
used in forty percent of the wrongful convictions exposed by post-
conviction DNA testing).198  Comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) 
has recently been abandoned after decades of use because an exhaus-
tive analysis by the National Research Council concluded that there 
was no scientific basis for the claim that it could “match” crime scene 
bullets to particular boxes of bullets.199  Other forensic “sciences,” in-
cluding traditional ballistics identification,200 bite mark identifica-
tion,201 and handwriting analysis,202 among others, similarly lack a 
 195 See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 109, 109–24 (1991) (describing the results of various proficiency tests). 
 196 Garrett, supra note 23, at 59–60, 75. 
 197 Garrett, supra note 23, at 83 (noting that, of the first 200 DNA exoneration 
cases, 43 (22%) involved false hair or fiber comparisons); Giannelli, supra note 169, 
at 1074–76, 1096–97 (citing high error rates in hair microscopy cases, cases in which 
examiner error was exposed through postconviction DNA testing, and cases in which 
the scientific basis for the technique has been challenged); Paul C. Giannelli & Em-
mie West, Forensic Science: Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514, 514 (2001); 
Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107–08; Clive A. Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic 
Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil, 27 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 290–91 (1996) (discussing the questionable scientific 
foundation of microscopic hair analysis). 
 198 See Garrett, supra note 23, at 81; Jonakait, supra note 195, at 111; Jonakait, supra 
note 5, at 349 (describing the misuse of serology evidence in a case); Neufeld, supra 
note 12, at S108. 
 199 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 
(2004) [hereinafter NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE]; Jane Campbell Moriarty, Miscon-
victions, Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007); John Solo-
mon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, at A1. 
 200 See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1096–98; Joan Griffin & David J. LaMagna, 
Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on the Firing Line, CHAMPION, 
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 20–21. 
 201 See GRISHAM, supra note 174, at 263 (describing the flawed bite mark evidence 
in Greg Wilhoit’s wrongful conviction); I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for 
Human Bitemark Analyses—A Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85 (2001); Giannelli, supra 
note 169, at 1096–98; Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, From the Start, A Faulty Science: 
Testimony on Bite Marks Prone to Error, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2004, at 1; Flynn McRoberts, 
Bite-Mark Verdict Faces New Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2004, at 1. 
 202 See D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Igno-
rance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Exper-
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solid foundation in science, and have been misused to convict inno-
cent people.  And even more venerable forensic evidence, such as 
fingerprints203 and DNA typing,204 have produced proven errors.205
Worse yet, even in cases where crime laboratory analysts engaged 
in outright fraud, the defense bar has failed to scrutinize or challenge 
the work of those analysts.  Scandals such as the faked work of Fred 
Zain in West Virginia206 and Joyce Gilchrist in Oklahoma,207 as well as 
tise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 734 (1989); Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1096 & n.150 
(citing cases). 
 203 Simon Cole has catalogued twenty-two cases in which fingerprint evidence was 
mistaken.  Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint 
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 991 (2005).  Among the mistaken 
fingerprint matches, one of the most notorious in recent years is that of Brandon 
Mayfield.  FBI analysts investigating the Madrid terrorist bombing in 2004 matched 
Mayfield’s fingerprints to a crime scene print, claiming the match was “a 100% iden-
tification.”  Id. at 985–86.  Subsequent analysis by Spanish authorities linked the print 
to Ouhnane Daoud, an Algerian national living in Spain, and the FBI eventually con-
ceded that its analysts had erred.  Id. at 986; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON 
MAYFIELD CASE (2006); Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1096–97 & n.152 (citing cases); 
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime 
Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 203–05 (2008); Neufeld, supra note 12, at S108.  For an in-
teresting analysis of Judge Pollak’s two conflicting fingerprint opinions in United 
States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) and 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 
(E.D. Pa. 2002), see Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 56, at 66–74. 
 204 Of the first 200 DNA exonerations, three involved faulty DNA evidence intro-
duced at trial.  Garrett, supra note 23, at 81, 84. 
 205 For error rates on many of these identification sciences, see Saks & Koehler, 
supra note 191, at 895. 
 206 As the Chief Serologist in West Virginia for ten years, Fred Zain engaged in a 
pattern of overstating and misrepresenting the results of laboratory analyses, report-
ing results that were impossible or reporting results on tests never conducted.  See In 
re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 
503 (W. Va. 1993).  Zain’s misconduct was so rampant that the West Virginia Su-
preme Court concluded that, “as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary 
evidence offered by Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed 
invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible in determining whether to award a new trial in 
any subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.”  Id. at 506 (quoting judicial Report of 
Judge James O. Holliday); see also George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from  
the “Fred Zain Affair”, CHAMPION, May 1999, at 12–13; Giannelli, supra note 203, at  
172–74. 
 207 Raeder, supra note 108.  
  Joyce Gilchrist, an African-American forensic chemist, known as “Black 
Magic” for her ability to sway juries with evidence only she could see, was 
later investigated when many of her incorrect hair analyses were dis-
closed by DNA exonerations.  In a reversal of one of her more egregious 
cases, the court found that she knew her testimony was false and mislead-
ing because it was contradicted by evidence that was withheld from the 
defense.  
Id. at 1421 (citing Randall Coyne, Dead Wrong in Oklahoma, 42 TULSA L. REV. 209, 236 
(2006), and Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Gian-
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other fraudulent or sloppy work in places like Montana,208 the FBI 
Crime Laboratory,209 and the Houston Crime Laboratory,210 among 
many others,211 went undetected for long periods of time because de-
fense counsel failed to scrutinize and challenge their work.212
Part of the problem with the forensic sciences has been that they 
have emerged and flourished in a setting and culture that is far dif-
ferent than that for academic sciences.  Almost all of the forensic sci-
ences developed in police crime laboratories to aid the investigation 
nelli, supra note 203, at 174–82; Jim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by 
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A1. 
 208 In Montana, hair microscopist Arnold “‘Melnikoff repeatedly used an invalid 
system of hair analysis’ which always seemed to ‘place defendants at the scenes of 
Montana’s most heinous crimes.’”  Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Pun-
ishment Reform: An “Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 
299, 377 n.373 (2007) (quoting Charlie Gillis, Scandal in the Forensic Labs: Hundreds of 
Cases Undergoing Review in Montana, NAT’L POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at B1); see also Gian-
nelli, supra note 203, at 182–85; Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who 
Erred on ID, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. 
 209 Even the elite FBI Crime Laboratory has been touched by scandal, including 
cases in which analysts “gave inaccurate and incomplete testimony and testified to 
invalid opinions that appeared tailored to the most incriminating result.”  OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVE-RELATED AND 
OTHER CASES, Executive Summary pt. III, § C. (Apr. 1997); see also OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF 
PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES (2004). 
 210 See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second 
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 755 (2007) (describing scandal 
over shoddy work in the Houston Crime Laboratory).  According to Dr. Elizabeth 
Johnson, a former medical examiner with the Harris County Medical Examiner’s Of-
fice, Houston Police Department examiners “intentionally mislead . . . .  And in all 
the cases . . . they always mislead in favor of a conviction.”  Cooley, supra note 208, at 
377 n.373 (quoting Steve McVicker, Lab Chief’s Testimony in 3 Cases Questioned: Court 
Transcripts Show HPD Work Was Wrong, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 29, 2003, at A37); see 
also Giannelli, supra note 203, at 187–92. 
 211 See Garrett, supra note 23, at 64 (noting that scandals “have occurred at DNA 
laboratories in at least seventeen states”); Giannelli, supra note 203, at 166–208 (de-
scribing lab problems in Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Fort Worth, 
Montana, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, Seattle, Virginia, West Virginia, the FBI, and 
other jurisdictions); Murphy, supra note 210, at 755 n.154 (citing scandal and mal-
feasance at numerous laboratories around the country).  For a recent account of fo-
rensic fraud in Ohio, see DNA Proves Forensic Analyst Gave False Testimony, NORTH 
COUNTRY GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 2008, available at http://www.northcountrygazette.org/ 
news/2008/02/15/false_forensic_testimony.  For a recent account of ethical lapses 
and mistakes in the State of Washington toxicology lab, see Rachel La Corte, Head of 
WA State Patrol Forensic Lab Bureau Resigns, THE COLUMBIAN, Feb. 14, 2008, available at 
http://news.columbian.com/news/state/APStories/AP02152008news278407.cfm.  
 212 Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107, S109. 
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and prosecution of crimes.213  Most have no corollary in the academic 
sciences;214 they are not studied, taught, or tested in academic settings 
where reliability and accuracy—scientific “truth”—are the only values.  
Rather, they are developed and utilized in the adversarial world of 
crime investigation and prosecution, where those developing and 
evaluating the methods have an incentive to assume or accept their 
validity because they are useful in producing evidence of guilt.215  
Apart from DNA,216 almost all of the individualization forensic sci-
ences, including the most venerated of the pre-DNA forensic sci-
 213 William C. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science of Forensic DNA Test-
ing, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1997). 
 214 See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 148 (“Unlike many other endeavors, forensic 
science is often unable to adopt scientific knowledge and techniques from related 
areas.  Frequently, there is no related discipline to draw upon.”). 
 215 Thompson, supra note 213, at 1113–18.  Thompson argues that “[f]orensic sci-
entists play a fundamentally different role in society than do academic scientists.  The 
major imperative of the academic scientist is to advance scientific knowledge—to 
find truth through the use of the scientific method.”  Id. at 1113.  For forensic scien-
tists, on the other hand, Thompson says the “major purpose is to provide a service to 
a client by answering specific questions about evidence.”  Id. at 1114.  Accordingly, 
“forensic scientists have incentives to put the best possible face on their work, to 
promote the impression that their techniques are accurate and reliable and that 
their conclusions are trustworthy.”  Id.  Thompson maintains that forensic scientists 
thus have incentives to “avoid openly raising questions about the reliability of foren-
sic tests, avoid public discussion of technical problems or concerns, and refrain from 
publicly criticizing the work of other forensic scientists.”  Id.  And, because the foren-
sic scientist’s primary client is law enforcement, forensic scientists are susceptible to 
being co-opted so that they “adopt the goals of their clients as their own,” which “is 
problematic because the goals of law enforcement sometimes conflict with the goals 
of scientific objectivity and neutrality.”  Id. at 1115; see Risinger, supra note 12, at 126 
(DNA is distinguished among the forensic “sciences” because “DNA science is real 
science.  It was initially developed in academic scientific research for reasons having 
nothing directly to do with its courtroom applications.  It deals with a purely empiri-
cal issue appropriate to resolution by normal scientific methods.”) (footnotes omit-
ted); Saks, supra note 184, at 240–41 (noting that the forensic identification sciences 
“have little or no existence outside the courts.  They have few academic and no 
commercial counterparts that would carry out testing and development for their own 
purposes.”).  Paul Giannelli elaborates: 
[T]he research scientists who testified as experts in the DNA cases (for 
both the prosecution and defense) came from a “scientific” culture, 
unlike the many forensic examiners who work in crime laboratories 
and are sometimes described as “cops in lab coats.”  The DNA scientists 
were comfortable with quality control procedures, demanded written 
protocols, viewed proficiency testing as a positive development, and be-
lieved in open science and “not trial by ambush.”  All this was new to 
forensic science, which had grown to maturity in an adversarial envi-
ronment.” 
Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1106–07 (footnotes omitted). 
 216 “DNA typing is the exception.  It is the first individualization science derived 
from traditional science.”  Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: 
Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, JUDGES J., Fall 2006, at 16–17. 
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ences—fingerprint analysis—are premised on untested assumptions 
and unknown error rates,217 are not supported by statistical analyses 
that measure the significance of any purported matches,218 are ulti-
mately subjective,219 and hence are sometimes flat wrong.220
When defense challenges to forensic science evidence are 
brought, they are usually ineffectual.  Noting that most criminal de-
fendants are represented by poorly funded public defenders, contract 
attorneys, or appointed counsel, Neufeld observes: 
Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal 
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory.  Even when the most 
vulnerable forensic sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and 
handwriting—are attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibil-
ity citing earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hear-
ing.  Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge with ap-
propriate witnesses and new data.  Thus, even if inclined to 
mount a Daubert challenge, they lack the requisite knowledge and 
skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.221
Neufeld’s assessment is confirmed by data compiled by Michael 
Risinger, who examined every one of the 1600 state and federal cases 
in the Westlaw database that cited Daubert between Daubert’s date of 
 217 See Cooley, supra note 51, at 397 (noting that “error rates for many forensic sci-
entists are not known”); Jonakait, supra note 194, at 2117. 
 218 No databases exist that catalogue fingerprint patterns or the frequency of any 
such patterns in any population groups.  See Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 18.  
Without such databases, no statistical assessment can be made of the frequency with 
which any particular series or collection of fingerprint patterns might appear ran-
domly in the population.  See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of 
Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 609–13 (2002).  DNA analysis, 
by contrast, carefully assesses the frequency of particular alleles—or genetic varia-
tions—in various population subgroups.  See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 20–26 (2000).  With that data, scien-
tists can calculate the chances of a random match to any particular DNA profile in a 
given population group.  Id.  Without such data for fingerprints, analysts use their 
subjective judgment to determine when a series of fingerprint patterns is unique and 
rare enough to be deemed a match to the suspect, to the exclusion of all other per-
sons.  See Epstein, supra, at 612–14; Moriarty, supra note 199, at 13. 
 219 Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 26, 28. 
 220 See id. at 19–22, 24–25.  Ironically, although DNA is the most scientific of the 
forensic sciences, it is also the science that has been subjected to the most rigorous 
legal challenge and judicial scrutiny.  Yet, “[i]t was only when scientists from the 
wider scientific community became acquainted with how DNA technology was being 
applied forensically that doubts about the reliability of DNA evidence were brought 
to the attention of the legal system.”  Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Scientific 
Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1047 (1997).  Those doubts and challenges 
led to additional research, which ultimately improved the practice relating to and 
acceptance of DNA evidence.  Id. at 1049–50. 
 221 Neufeld, supra note 12, at S110. 
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decision in 1993 and August 2, 1999.  Risinger found that the defense 
bar had failed to raise serious challenges to even the most dubious of 
forensic evidence proffered by prosecutors.222  Risinger writes: 
     When I first started looking at these post-Daubert cases, I ex-
pected to find records of multiple well-litigated attacks on the 
weakest kinds of common prosecution-proffered expertise, with 
any system bias coming from judicial decisions.  What I found was 
an apparent systematic failure to seriously litigate these issues on 
the part of the criminal defense bar.223
The defense bar has simply not been up to the task of challenging 
unreliable forensic science. 
Risinger’s analysis also reveals that when admissibility is litigated, 
defendants almost always lose, whether they are challenging state-
proffered evidence or seeking to introduce their own expert testi-
mony.  Accordingly, as Neufeld has put it, “Lawyers are not the only 
problem—judges have to share some responsibility.”224  And, as Paul 
Giannelli has shown, the Supreme Court has acquiesced in a series of 
cases by failing “to impose the kind of ‘exacting’ standards in crimi-
nal prosecutions that are now required in civil litigation.”225
Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates that the pattern con-
tinues on appeal.  Brandon Garrett’s analysis of the first 200 postcon-
viction DNA exonerations, including 133 that produced written deci-
sions, reveals that, while flawed forensic science evidence contributed 
to the wrongful convictions in fifty-seven percent of the cases, chal-
lenges to such evidence were rare and successful challenges even 
rarer.226  Of those 133 cases with written opinions, not a single one in-
volved a direct constitutional challenge to the forensic evidence, only 
thirty-two (twenty-four percent) brought any challenge of any type to 
the evidence, and only fourteen (eleven percent) raised evidence-law 
 222 Similarly, Richard Underwood has observed that “many times lawyers default 
on their professional obligation to challenge [scientific] evidence.”  Richard H. Un-
derwood, Evaluating Scientific and Forensic Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 149, 152 
(2000) (footnote omitted).  “In too many cases,” he says, “the defense lawyer sits by 
as silent as the proverbial potted palm.”  Id. at 177; see Jonakait, supra note 195, at 
168–69 (noting that, despite the availability of information indicating high error 
rates in forensic science proficiency testing, defense lawyers have done little to detect 
such errors). 
 223 Risinger, supra note 12, at 135. 
 224 Neufeld, supra note 12, at S110. 
 225 Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1076; see id. at 1083–96 (analyzing United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); Delaware 
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); and Barefoot 
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). 
 226 See Garrett, supra note 23, at 76, 81. 
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claims.227  In those 133 appellate opinions, only a total of eight (six 
percent) granted any type of relief based upon the challenge to the 
forensic evidence.228  And these low numbers exist in a group of cases 
in which we know, with the benefit of postconviction DNA testing, 
that the inculpatory forensic evidence at trial was wrong. 
In combination, inadequacies of the defense bar and inhospita-
bility to defense forensic science have meant that some of the most 
unreliable forensic evidence has been admitted without much analy-
sis or discussion.  Risinger notes, for example, that bite mark evi-
dence is among the least reliable and most thinly validated of the fo-
rensic “sciences.”229  Yet, in his analysis of state and federal cases, of 
the forty-seven criminal cases that referenced bite mark evidence or 
forensic odontology, only four or five involved any foundational chal-
lenge to the reliability of the evidence, and those few challenges were 
brushed aside by citation to pre-Daubert cases without any real analy-
sis.230
The situation is not much different for other forensic individu-
alization evidence, such as handwriting identification.  Handwriting 
identification appeared in three hundred of the reported cases in Ris-
inger’s data set—120 in federal court and 180 in state court.231  De-
spite the absence of much scientific foundation for such evidence,232 
Risinger found only one reported state case in which a challenge “was 
made to the validity of any part of document examiner handwriting 
identification practice,” and only nine reported Daubert challenges to 
handwriting evidence in federal court—only two of which resulted in 
restrictions on the scope of the handwriting identification testi-
mony.233
Thus, Risinger concludes: 
[T]he numbers seem to indicate that civil defendants have bene-
fited greatly from Daubert, but that criminal defendants have not.  
This seems especially true in regard to what might be called non-
 227 See id. at 85. 
 228 See id. 
 229 Risinger, supra note 12, at 136–38.  Risinger notes that forensic odontologists 
have identified only a single validity study, and that 1975 study showed a seventy-six 
percent error rate in identifications by experienced examiners who were tested.  Id. 
at 137 n.144. 
 230 Id. at 135–36. 
 231 Id. at 139. 
 232 See generally D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification: The Scientific Status of 
Handwriting Identification Expertise, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 116, 
at 734; see also Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 202, at 734. 
 233 Risinger, supra note 12, at 139–40. 
FINDLEY_FINAL_V2 6/12/2008  11:27:07 AM 
942 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:893 
 
science forensic science, and it appears to be attributable partly to 
the inertia of courts, but at least as much to the criminal defense 
bar’s failure to construct sophisticated challenges and develop the 
evidence to support them.  Lest you doubt this conclusion, ask 
yourself this question.  If, after Daubert, substantial liability of 
General Motors or Microsoft were dependent on the identifica-
tion of bite marks found in various non-ideal media, and on their 
attribution to various corporate employees, is it not clear that 
these issues would have been litigated differently and more thor-
oughly than they have been, and that the results would have been 
different?234
Subsequent empirical analysis confirms Risinger’s findings.  An 
analysis of cases in the Westlaw database addressing admissibility of 
expert testimony, in both the five and one-half years before Daubert 
and the five and one-half years after Daubert,235 confirmed that, 
“[c]ontrary to the predictions of most commentators, the basic rates 
of admission at the trial and the appellate court levels did not change 
significantly after Daubert in criminal cases on appeal.”236  Moreover, 
at both the trial and appellate levels, prosecution experts were admit-
ted far more frequently than defense experts: 95.8% of prosecution 
experts were admitted at trial, compared to only 7.8% of defense ex-
perts; on appeal, 85.1% of prosecution experts were admitted, but 
only 18.8% of defense experts were admitted.237
One reason that traditional prosecution forensic science evi-
dence has not been subjected to rigorous methodological review by 
courts is, no doubt, as Risinger suggests, inertia or tradition.  Such 
evidence has been around for so long without much challenge that 
seriously questioning or excluding it now seems almost unthinkable.  
In this sense, forensic science evidence is to some degree similar to 
psychological testimony, which has generally been admitted without 
rigorous scrutiny.  In a different but related context, Christopher 
Slobogin has observed that “traditional psychological testimony is not 
subject to judicial scrutiny because it is . . . traditional and, more per-
suasively, because juries are not likely to consider it objective or infal-
lible, but rather will naturally treat it with skepticism.”238  But admis-
 234 Id. at 143. 
 235 Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Tes-
timony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 342 (2002). 
 236 Id. at 345. 
 237 Id. at 346. 
 238 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 28; see also Risinger, supra note 12, at 143 (noting 
that one reason criminal defendants have not gotten much traction to their chal-
lenges to forensic expert evidence is “inertia of courts”). 
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sion of forensic science evidence without rigorous scrutiny is more 
problematic than lax review of psychological testimony because fo-
rensic sciences are precisely the type of scientific evidence that juries 
are likely to consider objective and infallible.  When a scientist from 
the crime laboratory takes the stand to testify that fingerprints, or bite 
marks, or hairs, or other such evidence from the crime scene can be 
matched in the laboratory to the defendant, even—as such experts 
sometimes claim—to the exclusion of all other persons in the world, 
that testimony is likely to be accepted as conclusive.239
Moreover, it can be difficult to challenge forensic evidence be-
cause, in some areas of expertise, most experts are current or former 
state crime laboratory experts.240  Where does one find a toolmark 
examiner, fingerprint analyst, or bullet lead composition scientist?  
The only place these “experts” exist—because the only place these 
“sciences” exist—is in the government crime laboratories or spin-off 
private laboratories whose roots are in the law enforcement commu-
nity.  As a general matter, therefore, the only experts in these fields 
available to the defense are retired crime laboratory analysts, or aca-
demic scientists in different but related fields.241  Indeed, empirical 
evidence shows that, in appeals involving challenges to the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony, the appellant—the one challenging the ad-
missibility of the evidence—was the defendant in seventy-six percent 
of the cases, and in sixty-six percent of the cases, the appellant of-
fered no expert of her own at all.242
In this sense, again, DNA is unique.  DNA evidence has received 
considerable and exacting judicial scrutiny—and its methods and 
protocols have improved as a result—in part because DNA is one sci-
ence in which there are experts outside the crime laboratories who 
are available to defense lawyers.243  As Risinger has observed, “because 
DNA is academic science, the defense attorney had experts available 
 239 “As one juror put it after a recent trial in Queens, N.Y., ‘You can’t argue with 
science.’”  Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 46.  “[T]he esoteric nature of an 
expert’s opinions, together with the jargon and the expert’s scholarly credentials, 
may cast an aura of infallibility over his or her testimony.”  Id. at 48. 
 240 See, e.g., Saks, supra note 184, at 240 (The forensic identification sciences “have 
little or no existence outside the courts.  They have few academic and no commercial 
counterparts . . . .”).   
 241 See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 170 (Defendants have a “fundamental problem” 
in locating qualified experts, in part because “the experts are either employees or 
former employees of law enforcement agencies.”) (quoting Edward Imwinkelried, 
Observations on Access to Expertise, 101 F.R.D. 639, 640 (1983), and MICHAEL SAKS & R. 
VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 26 (1983)). 
 242 Groscup et al., supra note 235, at 344–45. 
 243 See Risinger, supra note 12, at 125–27. 
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from the academic community who could provide virtual turn-key tes-
timony on relevant points of weakness.”244  The same simply is not 
true of most of the individualization forensic sciences. 
Part of the problem, when it comes to forensic sciences, is that 
there is little or no research to draw on; in most disciplines, no one 
has done the research to either validate or undermine the individu-
alization sciences.245  When Daubert challenges have been brought, 
one consequence has been that in some cases, such as for handwrit-
ing analysis, the challenges have prompted research.246  As discussed 
below, in other instances where an outside organization has done the 
research, the research has sometimes revealed that the “science” is 
not scientific, and has led to its discontinuation.247  Currently, there is 
little incentive to do the research.  These “sciences” are outside main-
stream academic areas, police have little incentive to do the research 
because the evidence is already routinely admitted and accepted, and 
defendants have neither the resources nor the sophistication or in-
clination to undertake the research.  As the forensic sciences have 
come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, this is beginning to 
change, but far more work is still needed. 
 244 Id. at 127 (footnote omitted).  Even with DNA, however, finding defense ex-
perts was very difficult initially.  When DNA first emerged as a forensic tool in the 
late 1980s, defense counsel initially reported an inability to locate any molecular bi-
ologists willing to testify and critique the forensic applications of DNA typing.  Neu-
feld & Colman, supra note 174, at 52. 
 245 See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1108 (“[B]asic scientific research is needed.  
Many forensic techniques gained judicial acceptance before demanding standards 
were required.”); Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fall-
out from the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tire, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12, 40 (2000) (“All 
the areas of forensic science discussed in this article share two common denomina-
tors:  In each area little rigorous, systematic research has been done to validate the 
discipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in each area there is no evident rea-
son why such research would be infeasible.”); Jonakait, supra note 195, at 131–32, 137 
(noting that neither universities nor the crime laboratories do much research on the 
forensic sciences).  Michael Saks notes that Daubert has been important because it has 
demanded some research to support the forensic individualization sciences: “[F]rom 
many fields the courts will receive nothing better than what they required.  Many 
fields, perhaps most notably the forensic identification sciences, will do whatever it 
takes to satisfy the courts and little more.”  Saks, supra note 184, at 240. 
 246 See Giannelli, supra note 169, at 1098, 1098 nn.156–57 (citing Moshe Kam et 
al., Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778 
(1997); Moshe Kam et al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of Non-
Professionals in Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998); 
Sargur Srihari et al., Individuality of Handwriting, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 856 (2002)). 
 247 See infra notes 361–95 and accompanying text. 
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B. Institutional Impediments to Proper Adversary Adjudication  
of Forensic Science Issues 
Given these circumstances, the adversary adjudicatory process 
cannot work well in criminal cases to ensure the reliability of forensic 
science evidence.  Some contend that the adversary process by design 
is not well-suited to seeking the truth on such matters.  Under the ad-
versary process, “party control dictates that the sole source of the 
truth comes from evidence offered by the parties through their at-
torneys.”248  Yet, the argument goes, the objective of the parties is not 
to present or seek the truth; rather, “the objective in an adversarial 
trial is victory.”249  If the truth is incompatible with the adversary goal 
of winning, “then the attorney must do all she can—within decidedly 
vague ethical constraints—to hide or distort the truth.”250  In criminal 
cases, when it comes to expert evidence, the problem is even more 
profound; the problem is not just that the parties are not properly 
motivated, but that, as we have seen, the defense is ill-equipped to ob-
tain, present, or challenge forensic science evidence. 
In addition, judges251 (and juries)252 lack the training and re-
sources to assess forensic science evidence; they don’t adequately un-
derstand science or the scientific process.253  The Daubert regime re-
quires judges to evaluate science in a way they never had to before—
on scientific terms.  But judges generally are not equipped to do that.  
Thus, while Daubert promises to improve the scrutiny of scientific evi-
 248 Strier, supra note 13, at 103. 
 249 Id. at 101. 
 250 Id. at 104. 
 251 See Groscup et al., supra note 235, at 340–41, 367 (noting research indicating 
that judges “lack understanding of [the Daubert reliability criteria] and of scientific 
reliability in general”). 
 252 “Given their lack of scientific sophistication and innumeracy, jurors are likely 
to overestimate the significance of [expert testimony].”  Underwood, supra note 222, 
at 166.  Commentators have observed that juries, ill-equipped to evaluate scientific 
claims, default to “either deferential acceptance when only one expert testifies, or 
selection between the experts as attractive persons and apparently authoritative fig-
ures when two experts oppose each other.”  Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 56, at 
29. 
 253 Indeed, the very enterprises of law, as applied by judges and juries, and science 
are quite different.  “The relationship between science and law has been described as 
a marriage of opposites, as a conflict between rival systems, and as a clash of cul-
tures.”  Redmayne, supra note 220, at 1035 (footnotes omitted).  For example, scien-
tific knowledge is always contingent, evolving, and disputable.  But the legal world 
demands final resolution, even when disputes resolve around unsettled scientific 
propositions.  As Redmayne puts it, “[w]e expect scientists to give us answers before 
all the evidence is in.”  Id. at 1031.  In the legal world, “[j]ustice and finality take 
precedence over truth, but science progresses.”  Id. at 1042. 
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dence and end the deference to the scientists who are proponents or 
practitioners of their own particular theory or method, Daubert cre-
ates a new set of problems by shifting the decisionmaking about the 
sciences from scientists to ill-equipped judges.  Michael Saks observes:  
The major paradox of judicial gatekeeping of “scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized” expert knowledge is that those to whom 
the law assigns the responsibility for screening such evidentiary of-
ferings have no particular expertise for conducting those evalua-
tions.  Our legal system provides judges with few tools to help 
them evaluate the assertions of experts.254   
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his Daubert concurrence, ex-
pressed concern that judges do not understand scientific principles 
such as “falsifiability,” and voiced discomfort with the notion that 
Daubert would turn judges into “amateur scientists.”255
A recent example of the challenges facing judges when con-
fronted with scientific evidence can be found in Justice Breyer’s reac-
tion to the parties’ competing claims about the humaneness of the 
three-drug protocol used for lethal injections, and the competing 
claim that a different combination or a one-drug protocol would be 
more humane.  In Baze v.  Rees, the Court recently affirmed a decision 
of the Supreme Court of Kentucky that the three-drug cocktail does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishment.256  At oral argument, Justice Breyer noted that 
he had read the scientific articles challenging the three-drug protocol 
that were cited in the briefs filed by the inmates, but that he found 
them confusing.  “So I’m left at sea,” he said.  “I understand your 
contention.  You claim that this is somehow more painful than some 
other method.  But which?  And what’s the evidence for that?  What 
do I read to find it?”257
 254 Saks, supra note 184, at 230 (footnote omitted). 
 255 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993). 
 256 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
 257 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Chilly to Bid to Alter Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 8, 
2008.  In his concurring opinion in Baze, Justice Breyer again noted the conflicting 
scientific reports about the three-drug cocktail, but ultimately relied upon default 
litigation rules, rather than science, to uphold current practice:  
  I believe that the legal merits of the kind of claim presented must inevi-
tably turn . . . upon facts and evidence.  And I cannot find, either in the 
record in this case or in the literature on the subject, sufficient evidence 
that Kentucky’s execution method poses the ‘significant and unnecessary 
risk of inflicting severe pain’ that petitioners assert. 
128 S. Ct. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion simi-
larly cited the debate in the medical literature, and noted that the Court is not insti-
tutionally capable of resolving that dispute:  
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Similar concerns were expressed recently by a trial judge con-
fronted with testimony from competing experts about mitochondrial 
canine DNA.  Expressing a need for help in the way of “accreditation 
and documentation of scientific procedures,” he said: 
     I had a case recently that involved mitochondrial DNA, and I 
had one expert that told me the database was good, and the other 
expert told me the database was no good. 
     And I had a statistics guy who came from Mongolia who I 
couldn’t understand, and basically, Wisconsin doesn’t have the 
Daubert rule, so it was real easy for me.  I just said, no, this goes to 
the jury, the jury can sort it out.  But it left me with a distinct fear 
that I was at some point going to have a jury that decided, well, it’s 
DNA, it’s good, and then I had to decide whether or not it met 
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt and throw the case 
out after the jury found the guy guilty. 
     Luckily for me, the prosecutor threw the case out before he 
went to trial, which I think was a good decision.  But the idea of 
not having a basis for me without trying to find on my own behalf 
an expert who I felt was, could give me the ultimate answer on 
this database issue and incurring the county’s expense to do that 
beyond what they’ve already incurred left me in the dark, basi-
cally, and . . . having some kind of a standard or protocol in that 
situation would have been of assistance.258
He then elaborated: 
The issue was the efficacy of this database, which was a dog data-
base that was part of the one that everybody submits things to.  
There’s no control about things going into it . . . and both these 
people came from accredited labs. 
     One guy was from Michigan State, and although he wasn’t for-
ensically accredited, he was accredited through some university 
program, and the other one was a veterinarian down in Texas 
who had an accredited DNA lab.  And the issue really was whether 
or not this database that the Michigan State guy was using was an 
effective database for the purpose of forensic science. 
     And it made a tremendous amount of difference, because if 
you used the database that she wanted you to use, the numbers of 
dogs that matched the circumstance multiplied dramatically over 
We do not purport to take sides in this dispute.  We cite it only to con-
firm that a ‘best practices’ approach, calling for the weighing of relative 
risks without some measure of deference to a State’s choice of execution 
procedures would involve the courts in debatable matters far exceeding 
their expertise.   
Id. at 1532 n.2. 
 258 Transcript of Proceedings of the Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commis-
sion, Nov. 27, 2007, at 21. 
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the number of dogs that matched the circumstance using the in-
formation used.  And I didn’t feel that I had really a basis to de-
termine it based on what each of them were telling me, which was 
whether that database was actually an effective database or not.259
Indeed, research confirms that judges and juries do not under-
stand science or the scientific principles required for evaluating the 
validity of scientific studies.260  A survey of four hundred state court 
judges published in 2001 revealed that “[o]nly six percent of respon-
dents demonstrated a good understanding of the concept of ‘falsifi-
ability,’ and just four percent had a clear understanding of error 
rate.”261  Judges in one study “were no more likely to admit a valid 
study than they were to admit a study that lacked a control group, 
contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter 
bias.”262  Yet judges tend not to realize their lack of understanding.  In 
a three-state survey, nearly eighty percent of judges asserted that ex-
pert testimony was rarely too technical for them to understand.263  As 
Janet Hoeffel has put it, because judges are ill-equipped to evaluate 
scientific evidence, “[t]he shift of responsibility from the scientific 
community to the judiciary has simply been too much to bear.”264
Similarly, research indicates that jurors often do not understand 
the fundamentals of scientific evidence, and lack the “ability to rea-
son about statistical, probabilistic, and methodological issues effec-
tively.”265  Various studies have shown that lay people are insensitive to 
 259 Id. at 22–23. 
 260 David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 817, 817 (1977) (noting that judges are, for the most part, technically illiterate); 
Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1320 (“there is little reason to believe that judges are spe-
cially equipped” to evaluate scientific evidence); Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B. Meyer, 
Scientific Experts: Making Their Testimony More Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 313, 319, 326 
(1999) (noting that most litigators and judges admit that they lack a solid foundation 
in science); Jeffrey N. Martin, Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of 
Scientific Uncertainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443, 473 (1979) 
(“Most judges and most commentators acknowledge the incompetence of judges to 
decide matters of scientific uncertainty.”); Bradley D. McAuliff et al., Juror Decision-
Making in the 21st Century: Confronting Science and Technology in Court, in HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS (D. Carson & R. Bull eds., 2d ed., 2003); Saks, supra 
note 184, at 230 (noting that judges have no expertise to assess scientific evidence 
under Daubert).  
 261 Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science: Progress 
Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 643 (2007) (citing Sophia I. Gatowski et al., 
Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-
Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2001)). 
 262 McAuliff et al., supra note 260, at 305. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1324. 
 265 McAuliff et al., supra note 260, at 305. 
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sample bias; fail to recognize the unreliability of tests involving small 
samples; demonstrate considerable variability in their statistical rea-
soning skills; have failed to note the significance of missing compara-
tive or control group information; underutilize expert probabilistic 
testimony compared to Bayesian norms; have difficulty understand-
ing statistical evidence; and underutilize statistical evidence.266
In the end, because judges and juries are not experts, scientific 
decisions, including decisions about admissibility, tend to be made 
based on assessments of the personality, credentials, and perceived 
credibility of the experts, more than on the validity of scientific re-
search: “An advantage lies with the party whose expert has the most 
persuasive forensic skills rather than the most authoritative and meri-
torious testimony.”267  And because prosecution experts tend to be 
government employees, imbued with the authority and apparent ob-
jectivity of their position, while defense experts tend to look like 
hired guns,268 the result has been that most prosecution experts are 
admitted, but defense experts are not, regardless of the scientific 
merits of their evidence.269
In sum, under these conditions, the adversary case-by-case 
method, dependent on individual prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
judges, and juries and their ability to understand and marshal the 
requisite expertise in case after case, especially given the system’s 
many imbalances, is not a good way to address forensic sciences.270  
The risk of error in individual cases is high. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Strier, supra note 13, at 133; see Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Sci-
ence and Law: Conflicting Norms in the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcom-
ing 2008) (describing how judges decide scientific questions based on “the norms of 
persuasion within the courtroom: witness credibility including factors such as de-
meanor, assessment of bias, completeness of explanation, and certainty of opinion,” 
leading to decisions that can go “against the body of generally accepted scientific 
evidence”). 
 268 Slobogin, supra note 126, at 117.  “[A]ny one attorney’s attempt to obtain re-
search for a particular case is likely to meet a hostile reception from the courts, be-
cause it is so obviously motivated by litigation needs.”  Id.    
 269 Groscup et al., supra note 235, at 344–45; Joëlle Anne Moreno, What Happens 
When Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2004); Risinger, supra note 12, at 105–08. 
 270 Some contend that, even operating optimally, the adversary process is not a 
reliable way to address complex scientific issues. 
But the most basic problem is that adversarial procedure assigns sole 
responsibility for conducting the inquiry to the functionaries who may 
be least interested in exposing the relevant scientific evidence.  The at-
torney will want to omit and distort any evidence not presenting his cli-
ent’s case in the best possible light.  When expert witnesses are pushed 
into advocacy roles, attorneys corrupt the value of their expertise. 
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Another consequence of leaving admissibility questions to the 
adversary adjudicative process is that stare decisis can quickly become a 
substitute for analysis, and can freeze judgments about science even if 
the science itself continues to evolve.  To the extent that stare decisis 
minimizes the need for repeated, case-by-case determination, it can 
do so in the wrong way—by locking in misjudgments about science, 
and preventing fluid adaptation of admissibility or other legal stan-
dards to reflect changing scientific knowledge.271  Michael Risinger, 
for example, has traced the history of bite-mark evidence, showing 
how admissibility was initially based on one case manifesting excep-
tional circumstances establishing reliability that was subsequently 
cited and spread without re-analysis to become accepted doctrine.272
Conversely, when stare decisis does not control, another effect of 
the Daubert doctrine is that, by taking the review of scientific evidence 
from the scientific community and giving it to trial judges, the lower 
courts “are deciding the same issues differently.  A particular exper-
tise or scientific method may be admitted in one court and denied in 
another.  The effect is a patchwork of admissibility in many areas of 
expertise.”273  Judges’ lack of training and experience necessary for 
evaluating scientific opinions means that “their comprehension and 
handling of scientific issues is intrinsically not predictable.”274
All of this suggests that the adversary system, at least as presently 
constituted, cannot cope with forensic science evidence in criminal 
cases.  To work effectively, the adversary process needs assistance.  As 
Peter Neufeld has put it, “[i]f the courts cannot be relied upon for 
this protection [against unreliable forensic science], other remedies 
must be found further ‘upstream’ so that the disreputable evidence is 
never proffered.”275
Strier, supra note 13, at 114. 
 271 Hoeffel, supra note 74, at 46–47 (noting the ways in which deference to prior 
judicial opinions has been substituted for serious reliability analysis for numerous 
forensic sciences). 
 272 Risinger, supra note 12, at 135–39. 
 273 Hoeffel, supra note 1, at 1324. 
 274 Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 260, at 326. 
 275 Neufeld, supra note 12, at S111. 
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IV. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 
A. First Steps 
1. Limiting the Scope of Forensic Evidence 
A number of suggestions have been made to address these prob-
lems, including encouraging courts to limit the admissibility of expert 
testimony by disallowing unsupported conclusions that crime scene 
evidence and evidence from the defendant “match.”276  Similarly, 
rules might disallow “overpowering or misleading testimony,” such as 
testimony that identified fingerprints had to have come from the de-
fendant to the exclusion of everyone else in the world.277  Jury instruc-
tions might also be used to help juries put shaky but admissible ex-
pert forensic evidence into proper context.278
2. Regulating Crime Laboratories 
Others have suggested regulation through accreditation and cer-
tification of crime laboratories and analysts.279  The federal govern-
ment regulates all medical clinical laboratories under the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvements Act of 1988,280 and the empirical evidence 
shows considerable quality improvement when laboratories are regu-
lated.281  Noting that clinical laboratories that serve the medical pro-
fession are subject to such regulation, including mandatory accredita-
tion and proficiency testing, but that crime laboratories are not, Peter 
Neufeld and Neville Colman observe that “there is more regulation of 
clinical laboratories that determine whether one has mononucleosis 
than there is of forensic laboratories able to produce DNA test results 
that can help send a person to the electric chair.”282
Among a growing chorus of scholars who now argue for manda-
tory regulation of crime laboratories, Paul Giannelli points out that, 
in developing a regulatory scheme, “there is no need to start from 
 276 Under this suggestion, because the data does not exist to permit any meaning-
ful understanding of what a “match” means, one solution could be “to allow the ex-
aminer to discuss the points of comparison but to disallow the examiner from declar-
ing a match or asserting conclusions.”  Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 29. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 31. 
 279 See Giannelli, supra note 203, at 208–20; Jonakait, supra note 195, at 172–91 
(citing the Clincal Laboratories Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1983)). 
 280 Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a 
(2007)). 
 281 Jonakait, supra note 195, at 173; see also Giannelli, supra note 203, at 211. 
 282 Neufeld & Colman, supra note 174, at 53. 
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scratch,” because “DNA labs are presently regulated and can serve as 
a model for all crime laboratory units.”283  In 1988, the FBI estab-
lished the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods 
(TWGDAM), which was later renamed the Scientific Working Group 
on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), with responsibility for devel-
oping quality control standards for DNA laboratories.284  Thereafter, 
in 1994, Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act, which created 
the Combined Offender DNA Index System (CODIS), the national 
databank of DNA profiles of convicted offenders.285  At the same time, 
Congress created a DNA Advisory Board (DAB) to promulgate quality 
assurance standards, and required proficiency testing of examiners 
and external audits.286  Finally, as a part of the Justice for All Act of 
2004, Congress mandated accreditation of all DNA labs as a require-
ment for eligibility to contribute to or access CODIS.287  As Giannelli 
therefore observes: “Thus, the paradox: the most scientifically sound 
procedure—DNA analysis—is the most extensively regulated, while 
many forensic techniques with questionable scientific pedigrees are 
completely unregulated.”288  Similar regulation of all crime laborato-
ries would go a long way toward compensating for the inadequacies 
of the adversary criminal justice system alone to ensure good quality 
forensic science. 
In recent years, a number of states have experimented with cre-
ating forensic science oversight boards, or forensic science commis-
sions.289  New York,290 Texas,291 and Oklahoma292 now mandate ac-
creditation of their crime laboratories.  Instead of creating a separate 
board and accreditation process for crime laboratories, Maryland has 
 283 Giannelli, supra note 203, at 208–09. 
 284 Id. at 209. 
 285 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2065 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
14131–14134 (West 2005)). 
 286 See Giannelli, supra note 203, at 171–72. 
 287 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132. 
 288 Giannelli, supra note 203, at 210. 
 289 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2007) (establishing forensic laboratory advi-
sory board); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995a-b (McKinney 2003) (establishing forensic science 
commission and requiring accreditation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West 
2007) (requiring accreditation); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35(d) (Vernon 
2005) (requiring accreditation by Texas Department of Public Safety); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 9.1-1101 (2006) (creating separate Department of Forensic Science and over-
sight committee).  The federal government has also encouraged reform.  See 42 
U.S.C.A. § 3797k(4) (West 2007) (requiring that DNA laboratories receiving federal 
grants create mechanisms for external independent investigations). 
 290 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-b (McKinney 2003). 
 291 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (Vernon 2005). 
 292 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (West 2004). 
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recently made crime laboratories subject to the same regulation as 
clinical laboratories under the Maryland Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene.293  But such experiments remain the exception, not 
the norm. 
Nationwide, voluntary accreditation and some proficiency test-
ing is now offered by the crime laboratories themselves, through the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accredi-
tation Board (ASCLD/LAB).294  But accreditation is not uniform, and 
doubts have been raised about the sufficiency of such voluntary self-
regulation: “Where labs are certified, there are still concerns about 
how meaningful that process may be.”295  Moreover, voluntary self-
regulation does not ensure that all forensic science service-providers 
are accredited.296  And while many of the individual disciplines have 
created certification boards in various forensic specialties like crimi-
nalistics, questioned documents, toxicology, physical anthropology, 
and psychiatry, “most forensic practitioners do not complete the 
somewhat costly process for certification because the profession does 
not mandate it to practice, and crime laboratories, the police, and 
the courts do not require it to examine case evidence.”297  Short of 
full-blown regulation, other commentators have urged certification 
programs that, at a minimum, require labs to participate in blind pro-
ficiency testing.298
While mandatory regulation—complete with lab accreditation, 
analyst certification, mandatory quality assurance standards (includ-
ing proficiency testing, laboratory audits, and corrective action pro-
cedures), and standardized technical procedures—would go far to-
ward protecting the criminal justice system against misleading or 
 293 Brian Witte, Md. Puts Teeth in Bill to Regulate Crime Labs, WTOPNEWS.COM, May 
7, 2007, http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=25&sid=1134411. 
 294 Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science: Progress 
Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 632 (2007). 
 295 Moriarty, supra note 199, at 8.  
 296 After evaluating the science and methods of DNA testing in 1992, the National 
Academy of Sciences issued a report noting, in part, that  
[v]oluntary accreditation programs are not enough.  Because profes-
sional organizations, such as ASCLD-LAB, lack regulatory authority, fo-
rensic laboratories could avoid accreditation and still offer DNA typing 
evidence in criminal proceedings.  In view of the important public-policy 
goal that this powerful technology be practiced only at the highest stan-
dard, compliance with high standards must be mandatory.  
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 106 (1992) 
[hereinafter NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY]. 
 297 Peterson & Leggett, supra note 294, at 632. 
 298 See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 182–90. 
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flawed forensic science, adversary imbalance and institutional incom-
petence will still make it difficult for the criminal justice system to 
cope well with increasingly complicated scientific evidence.299
3. Independent Court-Appointed Experts 
Other commentators have noted that courts can and should take 
more advantage of their authority to appoint their own independent 
experts.300  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, courts have such au-
thority. Science panels appointed by courts have been used to assist 
in complex tort cases, such as the silicone breast implant litigation.301  
Justice Breyer, concurring in Joiner, recommended that judges make 
greater use of their authority to appoint experts, and to look to estab-
lished scientific organizations for guidance.302   
While such independent experts can be helpful, they cannot be 
the whole solution.  The system almost certainly cannot afford the 
burden and expense of appointing independent experts in each case 
involving a serious scientific dispute.303  Nor can even an independ-
ently appointed expert be assured to get the science right, in part be-
cause there often is no one right answer in science.  The notion that 
an independent expert can find objective scientific truth ignores that 
science itself is socially constructed, and therefore cannot be deter-
mined definitively or by analysis of even a well-selected expert.304  As 
some critics have suggested, court-appointed independent experts 
“will eliminate the diversity of scientific opinions, but hearing only 
one side does not make testimony more reliable.”305
 299 See Giannelli, supra note 203, at 211–20. 
 300 Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 30; Peterson & Leggett, supra note 294, at 
643–44 (“Neutral experts clearly can assist the courts in evaluating the testimony of 
partisan experts by focusing on the scientific reasoning and methodology used by the 
experts and helping the court to determine if the experts’ conclusions and opinions 
are based on scientifically reliable data.”). 
 301 Moriarty & Saks, supra note 216, at 30 (citing Norris v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 881–82 (10th Cir. 2005)); see Moreno, supra note 188, at 1089. 
 302 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 303 See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 304 See Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 
JURIMETRICS 345, 347 (1992) (“[T]he ‘facts’ that scientists present to the rest of the 
world are not direct reflections of nature; rather, these ‘facts’ are produced by hu-
man agency through the institutions and processes of science, and hence they in-
variably contain a social component.”); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE 
ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 12–14 (1990). 
 305 Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 260, at 328 (footnotes omitted); see Joe S. Cecil & 
Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 525 (1994); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts 
and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 
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Moreover, as Sheila Jasanoff has explained, “scientific claims are 
intrinsically provisional, contingent, and subject to deconstruction 
under critical scrutiny.  Scientific claims, in short, are inherently 
open-ended.”306  Accordingly, while independent court-appointed 
experts might help judges in individual cases understand the science, 
and help them capture “a still frame out of the continually unfurling 
motion picture of science,”307 as is required in litigation, something 
more enduring, more receptive to the evolving and socially negoti-
ated nature of science is required to help the adversary adjudicative 
process cope with forensic science over the long haul. 
B. A More Comprehensive Approach: A Forensic Science  
Oversight Commission 
1. The Scientific Oversight Model 
More institutionalized oversight of forensic sciences, by scien-
tists, is needed to compensate for the inadequacies of adversary adju-
dication.  In other arenas, where science and policy intersect, we have 
created expert institutions to mediate important disputes.  Where 
public health and safety are at stake, for example, we rely on the ex-
pertise of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to analyze the 
science and make determinations to protect us from untested or un-
safe drugs.308  We also rely on institutions such as the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) to foster medical research to improve public 
health.309  Although the stakes are also high with forensic sciences—
in terms of individual well-being and public safety—we have no simi-
lar expert institutions to protect us from bad forensic science.  Peter 
Neufeld, among others, has therefore called for creating a national 
forensic science institute to validate technologies and methodologies 
and set standards for interpretation of data.310  Such a commission 
might be an example of the kind of “inter-cultural ‘bridging’ institu-
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 480 (1988); Carl Meyer, Science and Law: The Quest for the Neutral 
Expert: A View from the Trenches, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 36 (1997). 
 306 Jasanoff, supra note 304, at 356. 
 307 Id. 
 308 For more than a century, since the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the FDA 
and its predecessors have been responsible for regulating food and drugs in the 
United States.  See generally Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting the Public Health from 
Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-
Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117 (2007); John P. 
Swann, History of the FDA, http:www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm. 
 309 See generally National Institutes of Health, Overview, http://www.nih.gov/about 
/NIHoverview.html; About NIH, www.nih.gov/about/index.html#mission. 
 310 Neufeld, supra note 12, at S113. 
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tions,” which Peter Schuck has proposed, that rely on experts, institu-
tions, and decision-making rules of science to control core scientific 
questions, thereby enabling “the relevant scientific, legal, and politi-
cal values [to] be integrated with greater synergy and less waste.”311
Like the FDA, such an institute or commission should be a per-
manent, standing body charged with responsibility for overseeing the 
field of forensic sciences.  Such an institute could independently 
evaluate and validate (or invalidate) the sciences, establish recom-
mendations for admissibility, recommend or establish protocols, rec-
ommend cautionary instructions, create incentives for research and 
validation, provide funding for such research,312 and oversee accredi-
tation and blind proficiency testing.  And such a standing institute 
could revisit scientific questions as scientific knowledge evolves, to 
continually improve practice and our understanding of the signifi-
cance of various kinds of scientific evidence.  It might impose manda-
tory protocols and practices, but it need not finally determine ques-
tions of admissibility.  Instead, the information and quality 
improvements it would produce could be utilized in litigation to en-
hance the courts’ ability to make admissibility determinations and 
other such judgments that are more appropriately vested in legal de-
cision-makers. 
Such a plan would be consistent with the trend toward, and the 
need for, more reliance on administrative solutions to compensate 
for adversarial inadequacies.  As Darryl Brown has explained, 
[T]he strategy of pursuing accuracy through adversarial proc-
esses—through well-equipped defense counsel in particular—has 
reached a political limit.  Broadly speaking, legislatures are inter-
ested in accurate criminal adjudication, but they do not view zeal-
ous defense attorneys as the best way to achieve that goal.  Ac-
cordingly, adversarial process will not be a politically sustainable 
means for assuring the accuracy of fact-gathering.  Partisan chal-
lenges brought by defense counsel against the state’s evidence 
must become—and are becoming—less dominant tools for serv-
 311 Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (1993).  Schuck, for example, argues that “core scientific issue[s] like 
causation should be authoritatively decided within the scientific culture by institu-
tions that this culture designates as appropriate to the task . . . .  In the Bendectin 
cases and many others like it, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is that insti-
tution.”  Id. at 38–39. 
 312 As noted, currently there is very limited money in research of forensic disci-
plines.  Unlike civil matters in which pharmaceutical companies, asbestos manufac-
turers, and other industry players have financial incentives to fund research, the par-
ties to a criminal matter have neither the incentive nor the resources to fund the 
basic research that is needed. 
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ing a renewed popular commitment to accuracy.  Other actors 
and institutions, with different mixes of motives and weaknesses, 
are equipped to take on—and are starting to take on—more of 
that task.313
Such an institute or commission, by relying more on scientists to 
oversee forensic science, would in the end level the playing field and 
thereby enhance the adversary system’s capacity for finding the truth 
on questions related to such sciences. 
Although such a national institute does not presently exist, there 
are examples of such scientific oversight of forensic science questions 
that show how such an institute might work.  This would not be a sci-
ence court.314  Nor would such an institution replace the judicial role 
in making ultimate admissibility decisions, or judgments about guilt 
or innocence based upon scientific evidence.  Nor is this suggestion 
meant to embrace a naively positivist view of science by assuming that 
scientific questions can be resolved objectively and definitively by ex-
perts.  Rather, this proposal envisions an expert agency with the ca-
pacity and charge to generate the research and conduct the inde-
pendent analyses needed to help forensic scientists improve their 
practices, and to help courts evaluate a wide range of forensic science 
issues by providing the information they need to perform their 
Daubert gatekeeping role.  In short, we need to do for the rest of fo-
rensic science what we have done for DNA.315
a. An Example: The Maguire Seven 
Examples of such oversight, in isolated areas, abound.  In the 
1990s, Great Britain turned to an expert panel of scientists to resolve 
disputed scientific evidence in several notorious cases involving con-
victions related to the IRA bombing campaign of the mid-1970s.  In 
 313 Brown, supra note 24, at 1645. 
 314 A science court was proposed in 1976 by a White House Task Force as a means 
to use adversary adjudicatory processes to resolve scientific disputes that had impor-
tant public policy implications.  Edmond & Mercer, supra note 185, at 54.  Science 
courts were to be presided over by scientist-judges, who would receive testimony from 
scientific experts under cross-examination by science advocates.  Id.; see James A. 
Martin, The Proposed “Science Court”, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977); Jeffrey N. Martin, 
Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty: The Science 
Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443 (1979); Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an In-
stitution for Scientific Judgment, SCIENCE, May 12, 1967, at 763; Arthur Kantrowitz, The 
Science Court Experiment: Criticisms and Responses, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 
April 1977, at 44.  Such efforts “have failed because the scientific problem-solving 
methodology favors professional competence and authority rather than due process, 
and professional and trade organizations are mired by conflicts of interest that favor 
politics over scientific facts.”  Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 260, at 328. 
 315 See supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text. 
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1976, members of the Maguire family were convicted of explosives of-
fenses almost entirely on the basis of forensic scientific evidence indi-
cating that swabs taken from the defendants’ hands revealed traces of 
nitroglycerine.316  At trial, the defense called an expert who criticized 
the prosecution’s scientific evidence on various grounds.317  In the 
early 1990s, an in-depth judicial inquiry conducted by Sir John May 
vindicated the defense expert’s criticisms, and ultimately led the 
Court of Appeal to quash the convictions.318  As part of Sir John May’s 
judicial inquiry, he set up a scientific committee to attempt to settle 
the scientific disputes.  While the committee could not agree on all 
conclusions, the committee identified enough deficiencies in the 
original scientific evidence to undermine the convictions.319  As Mike 
Redmayne has observed, when confronted with such unsettled scien-
tific propositions as those at issue in the Maguire cases, “[a] scientific 
inquiry, like that eventually instigated by Sir John May, would have 
been the obvious scientific way to deal with unease about the evi-
dence.”320
b. An Example: The Eyewitness Identification  
Blue-Ribbon Panel 
Experts in a forensic science oversight institution need not be 
specialists or practitioners in a particular field—indeed, in many in-
stances they ought not be, in order to give them the objectivity 
needed to evaluate the forensic identification method at issue.  
Rather, they might be experts in fields related to the forensic identi-
fication method, or most importantly, they must be scientists who 
understand the scientific method and hence are capable of evaluat-
ing the scientific validity of the technique or process at issue. 
One example is provided by the recent work of a panel of scien-
tists that was convened to examine one issue related to eyewitness 
identification methods.  Eyewitness identification is one area that has 
drawn significant social science research, but also recently some con-
troversy about that research, culminating in competing studies that 
had conflicting results on at least one issue.  As explained below, a 
blue ribbon panel of scientists was able to review the competing stud-
ies and come to conclusions on their relative authority. 
 316 Redmayne, supra note 220, at 1039. 
 317 Id. at 1040. 
 318 Id. at 1040, 1043. 
 319 Id. at 1041, 1043–44. 
 320 Id. at 1043. 
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For many years, academic researchers, primarily research psy-
chologists, have studied human memory and perception, and in par-
ticular the ability of human beings to recognize and identify faces of 
strangers.321  That research has produced numerous insights and pub-
lished recommendations about the ways in which police ought to re-
form the eyewitness identification procedures to minimize the risks of 
misidentification.322  While the bulk of that literature is published in 
scholarly journals, some of the conclusions and recommendations 
have also been adopted by policy and procedure guides published by 
government technical advisory groups, state attorneys general offices, 
and local law enforcement offices.323  A few courts have also begun to 
take note and have incorporated this research into new legal stan-
dards on the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence, the 
admissibility of eyewitness experts, and jury instructions on a variety 
of identification-related matters.324  Finally, legislatures have begun to 
pay attention as well; a few have adopted legislation recognizing or 
 321 The first psychological research into eyewitness identification issues began 100 
years ago, and was conducted by Hugo Munsterberg.  See HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON 
THE WITNESS STAND (1908).  Munsterberg was ahead of his time, however, as the legal 
system refused to consider his research.  JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, 
COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION 9–34 (2005) (describ-
ing Munsterberg’s battle with Dean John Henry Wigmore for judicial recognition of 
the psychological principles underlying eyewitness error).  Research into eyewitness 
identification accelerated in the 1970s with the work of such pioneers as Elizabeth 
Loftus and Gary Wells, who, joined by many other researchers, have produced an 
enormous volume of research literature since then. 
 322 See, e.g., Wells et al., supra note 103.  
 323 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A 
TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS 
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov 
/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; BUREAU OF TRAINING AND STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION 3 (2005), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/Eyewitness 
Public.pdf; Gina Kolata & Iver Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way for Witnesses To 
Say, “It’s Him”, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A1. 
 324 See United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he science 
of eyewitness perception has achieved the level of exactness, methodology, and reli-
ability of any psychological research.”) (internal quotations omitted); United States 
v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000);  United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 
1401 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986); 
People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Peo-
ple v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265, 278 (Cal. 2000); State v. Dubray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 
2003) (relying upon “the scholarship on the subject of eyewitness testimony over the 
last decade”); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005). 
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incorporating some of these recommendations based on this scien-
tific research.325
Eyewitness identification reform has met significant resistance 
from many prosecutors and police, however, who have criticized the 
research because it is largely laboratory research that they complain is 
inapplicable in the real world.  They question whether laboratory 
studies—often utilizing mock crimes and college student witnesses—
accurately capture the experience of real witnesses who witness real 
crimes.  Two of the more significant of the recommendations have 
been particularly controversial among law enforcement—“double-
blind” administration of identification procedures, and sequential 
rather than traditional simultaneous presentation of suspects and fill-
ers in a lineup or photo array.  Under the double blind procedure 
the police officer administering the identification procedure must be 
one who does not know who the suspect was so that she cannot even 
unintentionally cue the witness or shade interpretation of the wit-
ness’s responses.  The sequential presentation of suspects and fillers 
(showing individuals one at a time rather than simultaneously) is de-
signed to encourage witnesses to make absolute memory-based judg-
ments about each individual rather than relative, “looks-most-like” 
judgments by comparing each displayed individual to the others.  In 
the laboratory, these and other procedures significantly reduce the 
rate of eyewitness error, and improve the ratio of correct identifica-
tions to mistakes. 
Noting that most of the research on these matters has been 
laboratory research,326 the Illinois legislature directed three Illinois 
police departments to undertake a field study to examine the effec-
tiveness of the double-blind sequential procedures.327  That project, 
involving the Police Departments in Chicago, Evanston, and Joliet 
under the direction of Sheri Mecklenberg, general counsel for the 
Chicago Police, produced results ostensibly contradicting the labora-
 325 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2008) (requiring North Carolina 
law enforcement to employ a range of research-based reforms, including double-
blind sequential procedures and proper witness instructions); WIS. STAT. § 175.50 
(2007) (requiring every law enforcement agency in the state to adopt written policies 
governing eyewitness identification procedures, and to consider employing double-
blind sequential procedures). 
 326 One field study in Hennepin County, Minnesota, had been conducted, which 
produced results consistent with those predicted by the laboratory studies, but it did 
not compare the double-blind sequential procedure to traditional non-blind simul-
taneous procedures.  Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Henne-
pin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
381 (2006). 
 327 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-10 (2008). 
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tory research, and purporting to indicate that the traditional, non-
blind simultaneous procedure produced more accurate identifica-
tions of suspects and fewer mistaken identifications of innocent fillers 
than did the double-blind sequential procedure.328
The Mecklenberg Report, named after its principal author, 
Sheri Mecklenberg, stirred up considerable controversy.  Police and 
prosecutors resistant to reform championed it as proof that their 
tried and true methods were best.329  Reformers and many eyewitness 
researchers, however, were appalled at methodological problems in 
the Report that they contended undermined its ability to say anything 
of value.330  The field research, they claimed, was marred by con-
founds that obscured any ability to interpret the data. 
For example, while the double-blind sequential procedure in the 
study was carefully controlled to ensure that every identification pro-
cedure followed the same protocol, the non-blind simultaneous pro-
cedures were not; police in various locations were permitted to con-
tinue doing whatever it was they had been doing all along.  The result 
was that it was difficult to tell what police were doing in the non-blind 
simultaneous procedures that got witnesses to pick suspects with 
greater frequency.  Moreover, the Mecklenberg Report used suspect 
picks as a proxy for accurate picks.  But of course, in a field study, one 
cannot know if suspects are in fact true perpetrators; the study as-
sumed that which the identification procedures were designed to test. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Mecklenberg Report failed to 
control for multiple variables.  By at once testing both the double-
 328 SHERI H. MECKLENBERG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:  
THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON DOUBLE-BLIND SEQUENTIAL IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org/IL%20Pilot%20on% 
20Eyewitness%20ID.pdf. 
 329 See, e.g., MASS. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CASES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2006), http://www.mass.gov/Dmdaa/docs/justice_ini 
ative_report/justice_initiative_report.pdf. 
 330 See NANCY STEBLAY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ILLINOIS FIELD STUDY DATA, available 
at http://web.augsburg.edu/~steblay/ObservationsOnTheIllinoisData.pdf (last vis-
ited March 6, 2008); Timothy P. O’Toole, What’s the Matter With Illinois? How an Op-
portunity Was Squandered to Conduct an Important Study on Eyewitness Identification Proce-
dures, CHAMPION, Aug. 2006, at 18; Gary L. Wells, Comments on the Mecklenburg Report 
(2006), http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/Illinois_Project_Wells_co 
mments.pdf (last visited March 6, 2008).  Some law enforcement agencies, which had 
adopted the double-blind sequential reform package, also rejected the Mecklenberg 
Report as methodologically flawed.  See OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF WISCONSIN, , 
RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, available at 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/ILRptResponse.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). 
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blind versus non-blind and the simultaneous versus sequential proce-
dures, it became impossible to tell which procedure was causing 
which effect.  This was particularly problematic here because it was 
entirely possible that the greater number of suspect picks (and corre-
spondingly fewer filler picks) in the non-blind simultaneous condi-
tion (the traditional method) was the result of the fact that the pro-
cedure was non-blind, not that it was simultaneous.  But that would 
be precisely what the laboratory studies would have predicted: in a 
non-blind procedure, police are likely to influence the results or the 
interpretation of the results in a way that would lead witnesses to pick 
their suspects.  What the Mecklenberg Report heralded as the supe-
rior results of the traditional identification procedures may have been 
nothing more than confirmation that police were able to influence 
witnesses to pick the person they wanted, without any guarantee that 
the picks in fact were accurate. 
Confronted with these competing research results and disputes 
about the validity of the research, what was a court or policy maker to 
do?  The research scientists in this field largely condemned the Meck-
lenberg Report for its methodological flaws, but others challenged 
the criticisms “as reflecting nothing more than the scientific com-
mentators’ stubborn loyalty to their own pre-existing beliefs.”331  How 
could a court or legislator, untrained in science, determine which in-
terpretation of the studies was correct? 
To help resolve this dispute in an objective, scientific manner, 
the Center for Modern Forensic Practice of the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice convened a blue-ribbon panel of social scientists to 
examine the controversy over the Mecklenberg Report.  Seven 
prominent social scientists, including experts in psychology, econom-
ics, and law—none of whom had been an eyewitness identification re-
searcher—convened to review the Mecklenberg Report.  The seven 
included Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman of Princeton and Har-
vard Professor Daniel Schacter.332  In 2007, they issued a report pub-
 331 Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the 
Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2007). 
 332 The full panel included: Daniel Schacter, Professor of Psychology, Harvard 
University; Robyn Dawes, Queenan Distinguished University Professor, Carnegie Mel-
lon University, and American Statistical Association Fellow; Henry L. “Roddy” Roedi-
ger III, James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor at Washington Uni-
versity, and former President, Association for Psychological Science; Larry L. Jacoby, 
Professor of Psychology, Washington University; Daniel Kahneman, Professor of Psy-
chology, Princeton University, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics; Richard Lempert, 
Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan School of Law, Division Director for 
the Social and Economic Sciences at the National Science Foundation, 2002–2006; 
Robert Rosenthal, Distinguished Professor University of California, Riverside, and 
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lished in the journal Law and Human Behavior concluding that indeed 
the study contains a confound—“a non-blind simultaneous proce-
dure is compared with a blind sequential procedure”—and that “the 
confound has devastating consequences for assessing the real-world 
implications of this particular study.”333  The panel explained: 
     If it is the case that the better outcome from the non-
blind/simultaneous procedure is partly or entirely attributable to 
subtle, unintentional cues provided by the administrator, then the 
Illinois results may simply underscore that the present procedure 
produces a biased outcome that may ultimately result in the in-
creased conviction of innocent individuals.  Stated slightly differ-
ently, it is critical to determine whether the seemingly better re-
sult from the simultaneous procedure is attributable to properties 
of the simultaneous procedure itself, or to the influence of the 
non-blind administrator.334
The panel also noted that the Mecklenberg Report’s results, in-
dicating that in two of the three police jurisdictions police reported 
zero filler picks in 152 lineups utilizing the non-blind simultaneous 
condition, provided further reason to be concerned about the Re-
port’s conclusions.  The panel concluded that the report of zero filler 
picks was suspiciously low, “justify[ing] the concern that administra-
tor bias is operating, either consciously or unconsciously; either by 
failing to count tentative ‘filler’ choices, or in steering witnesses away 
from fillers, or toward suspects.”335  In sum, the panel concluded that 
the Mecklenberg Report’s “design guaranteed that most outcomes 
would be difficult or impossible to interpret.  The only way to sort this 
out is by conducting further studies . . . .”336
Such field studies of actual identifications in real cases are cur-
rently under way, in a joint effort managed by the American Judica-
ture Society’s Institute of Forensic Science and Public Policy, in col-
laboration with the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Center for 
Modern Forensic Practice, the Police Foundation, the Innocence Pro-
ject, and the Center for Problem Oriented Policing.  The new field 
studies will employ a carefully designed research protocol that will 
control for all variables.  By using computer-administered photo ar-
rays, they will ensure that all potential biasing influences are elimi-
Pierce Professor of Psychology emeritus, Harvard University, Co-Chair Task Force on 
Statistical Inference, American Psychological Association.  See Schacter et al., supra 
note 331, at 32. 
 333 Id. at 4. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. 
 336 Id. at  4–5. 
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nated and that all witness responses are accurately recorded.  Thus, 
the expert panel has both helped to resolve a dispute within a scien-
tific field, and helped spur additional important research that should 
prove invaluable to policy makers and criminal justice practitioners. 
c. An Example: The NRC Forensic Science Studies 
On five occasions since 1979, the National Research Council 
(NRC), an arm of the National Academy of Sciences,337 has stepped 
into controversies over a few specific forensic sciences.  The NRC has 
evaluated the scientific validity and appropriate uses of voice identifi-
cation evidence,338 polygraph evidence,339 DNA evidence (twice),340 
and most recently, comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) evi-
dence.341  In each case, the NRC drew together distinguished panels 
of experts from a variety of fields who studied and reported in detail 
on the forensic science at issue.342  The reports have resulted in im-
provements in methodology and regulation for some fields (e.g., 
DNA), greater scrutiny by courts of others (e.g., voiceprints), and 
outright abandonment as unscientific of still others (e.g., CBLA). 
i. Voiceprints 
The first of these studies, published in 1979, addressed voice-
print identification evidence.  In 1976, at the request of the FBI, the 
 337 The National Academy of Sciences operates under a Congressional Charter 
with the following charge: “On request of the United States Government, [the Acad-
emy] shall . . . investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of sci-
ence or art.”  36 U.S.C.A. § 150303 (West 2008).  The National Research Council was 
created in 1916 and serves as the principal operating agency of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, with an express mission 
of stimulating surveying, collecting, and disseminating information about scientific 
matters of importance to the country.  Id.; Exec. Order No. 2859 (1918), as amended 
by Exec. Order No. 10668, 21 C.F.R. 3155 (1956), and Exec. Order No. 12832, 58 
C.F.R. 5905 (1993). 
 338 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE 
IDENTIFICATION (1979) [hereinafter NRC, VOICE IDENTIFICATION]. 
 339 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003) [herein-
after NRC, THE POLYGRAPH]. 
 340 NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 296; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996) [hereinafter NRC, EVALUATION OF 
FORENSIC DNA]. 
 341 NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 199.  CBLA is also sometimes referred 
to as Compositional Analysis of Bullet Lead (CABL). 
 342 Citing these studies, Paul Giannelli has noted the appropriateness of this ap-
proach, commenting that the required research into the forensic sciences “needs to 
be done outside forensic science.  It should be done by independent organizations 
such as the National Academy of Sciences . . . .”  Giannelli, supra note 169, at  
1108–09. 
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NRC appointed the Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectograms 
and charged it with conducting a study to determine whether the 
high speed sound spectograph could identify unique voice patterns, 
or “voiceprints,” matching individuals to voices captured in re-
cordings.343  The NRC formed a committee of eight members “repre-
senting the multiplicity of disciplines involved in voice identification 
and its uses.”344  After extensive study, the Committee concluded that 
“[t]he  practice of voice identification rests on the assumption that 
intraspeaker variability is less than or different from interspeaker 
variability.  However, at present the assumption is not adequately sup-
ported by scientific theory and data.”345  In sum, the NRC concluded 
that “the underlying theory of voiceprints had not been validated and 
[the] existing data did not support the proponents’ claims of high 
accuracy.”346  In response, courts began scrutinizing such evidence 
more carefully, although they remain split on its admissibility.347
ii. DNA 
In 1992, the NRC took up an examination of DNA.348  The NRC 
essentially concluded that forensic DNA analysis was good science 
and should continue, but highlighted areas in which DNA labs 
needed to improve their methods and procedures.  The NRC rec-
ommended, among other things, that DNA laboratories establish 
written laboratory protocols, develop objective and quantitative rules 
for identifying the pattern of a sample, use precise and objective 
matching rules, employ empirical testing to identify potential arti-
facts, identify the limits of each DNA typing procedure, subject each 
DNA typing procedure to publication in appropriate scientific jour-
nals, and develop a solid scientific foundation and base of experience 
 343 See Jonakait, supra note 195, at 142–44. 
 344 NRC, VOICE IDENTIFICATION, supra note 338, at 151. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Jonakait, supra note 195, at 143. 
 347 See State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1235 (Ariz. 1984) (citing the NRC Report 
as “particularly persuasive,” and holding that voiceprint evidence is inadmissible); 
State v. Free, 493 So. 2d 781, 783–89 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (citing the NRC Report, 
among other research, and holding that voiceprint evidence is inadmissible); People 
v. Hubbard, 738 N.W.2d 769, 769–70 (Mich. 2007) (Markman, J., concurring) (con-
curring in order denying petition for leave to appeal and urging the court to revisit 
the issue of admissibility of voiceprint evidence, and noting that, since the Michigan 
Supreme Court last addressed the issue in 1977, “five states have admitted such evi-
dence, [see, e.g., People v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999)], and six states have re-
jected such evidence, [see, e.g., State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224 (Ariz. 1984)].”). 
 348 See NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 298. 
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before employing any new DNA typing procedures.349  The NRC also 
made specific recommendations for compiling appropriate databases 
and utilizing appropriate statistical procedures for assessing the sig-
nificance of a match.350  Further the NRC recommended accredita-
tion and proficiency testing, establishment of quality-assurance pro-
grams, and creation of a National Committee on Forensic DNA 
Typing “to provide expert advice primarily on scientific and technical 
issues concerning forensic DNA typing.”351  The immediate result was 
to produce legal challenges to the admissibility of DNA (some suc-
cessful),352 and ultimately, an improvement in DNA laboratory prac-
tices.353
In 1996, the NRC revisited DNA because, at that time, the “winds 
of controversy” surrounding DNA profiling had “not been stilled.”354  
The second DNA report noted that the first report had “resolved a 
number of questions, and several of its recommendations were widely 
adopted.”355  In the second report, the NRC made recommendations 
about how to minimize errors in the laboratory and in chain of cus-
tody, proposed calculating procedures that take into account the 
question of population subdivision, and addressed statistical prob-
lems with the interpretation of DNA evidence, including the use of 
databases.  The Report was not without its critics,356 but since then 
DNA practice has gradually improved and current dominant DNA 
profiling techniques have achieved virtually unquestioned admissibil-
ity status.357
 349 Id. at 72. 
 350 Id. at 94–95. 
 351 Id. at 73, 108–09. 
 352 Following the first NRC DNA report, FBI Director William Sessions requested 
the second NRC study, noting in part that “11 of 30 appellate decisions on the admis-
sibility of DNA evidence had ruled it inadmissible and ‘courts in Canada, Australia, 
and the United Kingdom began hearing challenges to DNA evidence—citing the 
NRC report—immediately following its release.’”  William C. Thompson, Accepting 
Lower Standards: The National Research Council’s Second Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 
37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 407 n.7 (1997) (quoting Letter from William Sessions, Direc-
tor, FBI, to Dr. Frank Press, President, National Academy of Sciences, Apr. 16, 1993). 
 353 Berger, supra note 12, at 1127. 
 354 NRC, EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA, supra note 340, at v. 
 355 Id. 
 356 E.g., Thompson, supra note 352, at 410 (arguing that the second DNA report 
backpedaled on some of the recommendations from the first report). 
 357 Berger, supra note 12, at 1128. 
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iii. The Polygraph 
In 2003, the NRC examined the scientific validity of the poly-
graph.  This analysis was undertaken at the request of the U.S. De-
partment of Energy, primarily to examine the validity of using poly-
graphs as an employment and security screening tool.358  Thus, while 
the NRC also considered the use of the polygraph in criminal investi-
gations, its primary focus was on its use in non-incident-related 
screening tests of prospective government employees.  The NRC con-
cluded that “specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying 
from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below per-
fection.”359  But the NRC said that the polygraph was probably less ac-
curate when used as a non-incident-related screening tool, and that 
“[i]ts accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators 
from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in 
employee security screening in federal agencies.”360
iv. Bullet Lead 
The NRC’s most recent study of a forensic science provides a 
particularly revealing demonstration of the importance of enhancing 
the adversary process with neutral oversight of the forensic sciences 
by scientific experts.  For over forty years, the FBI analyzed and testi-
fied about the composition of bullet lead as a means of matching 
crime scene bullet fragments to bullets found in the possession of a 
suspect.361  The technique, first used in the investigation into Presi-
dent Kennedy’s assassination in 1963,362 was employed in cases in 
which bullet fragments collected from a crime scene were too small 
or damaged to permit standard ballistics analysis.363  In such cases, 
FBI analysts would analyze the bullet lead from crime scene frag-
ments and from bullets found in a suspect’s possession for seven trace 
elements—arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and cad-
 358 NRC, THE POLYGRAPH, supra note 339, at xiii. 
 359 Id. at 4. 
 360 Id. at 6. 
 361 D.H. Kaye, The Current State of Bullet-Lead Evidence, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 99, 99 
(2006). 
 362 John Solomon, Silent Injustice: Bullet-matching Science Debunked, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 19, 2007, at A1. 
 363 D.H. Kaye, The NRC Bullet-Lead Report: Should Science Committees Make Legal Find-
ings?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 92 (2005).  Ballistics examinations usually involve match-
ing the striations on a bullet caused by its passage through the barrel of a gun with 
marks on bullets fired from a suspect’s gun.  NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 
199, at 1. 
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mium.364  If the two bullets were determined “statistically to be ana-
lytically indistinguishable for each of the elemental concentration 
means,” the analyst would conclude that they probably came from the 
same “source.”365  The precise testimony about such matches varied 
from one analyst to the next, with some experts testifying that the two 
bullets were “analytically indistinguishable”366 or “could have” come 
from the same “batch” of lead.367  Other experts went further and tes-
tified that the two bullets came from the same “source,”368 or from a 
box manufactured the same day,369 or that the two bullets were made 
by the same manufacturer on the same day and at the same hour,370 
or even that they came from “the same box of ammunition.”371
Although the technique has been used in approximately 2500 
cases,372 until recently it was almost never challenged in court.373  In-
deed, there were no serious challenges to the technique until a re-
tired FBI examiner, William Tobin, began writing articles questioning 
the technique374—again, demonstrating both that the defense bar on 
its own was not up to the task and that one reason no experts chal-
lenged the technique was that the only experts were those engaged in 
or recently retired from the field itself.375  Although the technique 
had been used in criminal cases for decades, until recently there was 
virtually no research literature on the matter (particularly on the 
bases for statistical analyses employed),376 and courts routinely admit-
 364 Id. at 2. 
 365 Id. 
 366 E.g., Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
 367 State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012–13 (Or. 1974) (en banc). 
 368 United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1996); People v. Lane, 
628 N.E.2d 682, 689–90 (Ill. App Ct. 1993). 
 369 State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994); People v. Johnson, 499 
N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Ill. 1986); Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1991) (en banc), vacated, 509 U.S. 917 (1993). 
 370 Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979). 
 371 Commonwealth v. Daye, No. 11238-11246, 2005 WL 1971027, at *1 (Mass. Dist. 
Ct. Aug. 3, 2005); see Jones v. State, 425 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981); State v. Strain, 
885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
 372 Kaye, supra note 363, at 99 n.1. 
 373 Id. at 102. 
 374 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analasys (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43, 45 
(2003). 
 375 See State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 339–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quot-
ing affidavits establishing that, until recently, there were no experts outside the FBI 
capable of testifying about CBLA). 
 376 Giannelli, supra note 203, at 200. 
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ted it without much question.377  During the thirty-plus years in which 
CBLA was used, there were fewer than two dozen published appellate 
opinions on the technique, and all but one of the courts that ad-
dressed CBLA admitted it.378 Indeed, in one of the few cases in which 
a defendant sought to fight the CBLA evidence, the defendant did 
not move to exclude the FBI testimony as unreliable, but instead 
sought to introduce his own expert challenging the FBI expert’s con-
clusions.379  The court, however, excluded the defense expert on the 
basis that the defense expert was offered only to testify about the 
manufacturing process, and he was not an expert in that.380  The jury 
heard the state’s CBLA evidence without rebuttal. 
Finally, in response to the criticisms leveled by Tobin and his co-
authors, the FBI asked the NRC to study the technique.  The NRC 
appointed a committee of fourteen experts in science, engineering, 
mathematics, statistics, criminalistics, and law to conduct the study.381  
In a 2004 report, the NRC concluded that the instrumentation and 
method for measuring trace elemental concentration—the modern 
technique is known as inductively coupled plasma-optical emission 
spectroscopy, or ICP-OES382—is valid and reliable,383 but that the 
available data do not support testimony that two bullets originated 
from the same box of ammunition or from the same manufacturer, 
or were manufactured on the same date.384  The FBI initially re-
sponded defensively, reaffirming its view that the testimony of its ana-
lysts was valid and scientifically sound.385  But armed with Tobin’s 
 377 Kaye, supra note 361, at 102 (collecting cases). 
 378 Mark Hansen, Bullet Proof, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 61. 
 379 State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994). 
 380 Id. 
 381 NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 199, app. at B. 
 382 Previously, analysts had used a technique known as neutron activation analysis 
(NAA).  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 374, at 44. 
 383 NRC, BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 199, at 23. 
 384 Id. at 107. 
 385 Indeed, John Solomon, an investigative journalist with the Washington Post who 
did an in-depth investigation into the FBI’s handling of CBLA evidence, reports: 
As early as 1991, the FBI lab had done a study that raised questions 
about some of the assumptions being made about lead bullet matches.  
But rather than seeing the red flags, the scientists dismissed them as co-
incidences.  In 2002 when one of the FBI’s own retired metallurgist[s] 
questioned the science, the FBI sought to drown out his concerns by 
flooding the forensic science journals with articles praising the bullet 
lead science.  And even after the National Academy of Sciences con-
cluded the science was flawed in both its statistics and testimony, many 
in the lab fought to continue its use or at least to minimize the prob-
lems when informing the public. 
Solomon, supra note 362.  
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criticisms and the new NRC Report, defense lawyers and courts began 
to question the technique.386  Beginning around the time of the NRC 
Report, courts began excluding CBLA testimony.  Reflecting the im-
pact of the NRC Report, for example, in Ragland v.  Commonwealth, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court issued an opinion in 2004 just prior to 
publication of the report that rejected an attack on bullet-lead testi-
mony.387  Two years later, after publication of the NRC Report, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court reheard the case.  Quoting extensively from 
the Report, the court this time concluded that the bullet lead evi-
dence was inadmissible under Daubert.388  Other courts have followed 
suit.389
In 2005, a year after the NRC Report, the FBI abandoned CBLA 
altogether.390  The FBI reported, in a letter to the executive director 
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in late 
summer 2005, that the FBI was discontinuing its use of CBLA “based 
primarily on the inability of scientists or manufacturers to definitively 
evaluate the significance of an association between bullets made in 
the course of a bullet lead examination.”391  Yet in that same letter, 
the FBI continued to insist that “the FBI Laboratory still firmly sup-
ports the scientific foundation of bullet lead analysis,” and that it was 
dropping the analysis only because of “the costs of maintaining the 
equipment, the resources necessary to do the examination, and its 
relative probative value.”392  But by 2007, the FBI conceded that any 
testimony suggesting that CBLA could identify a bullet as coming 
from any particular box of bullets was insupportable,393 and an-
nounced that it would review all bullet lead cases in which its agents 
testified and alert prosecutors to any misleading statements so that 
 386 An article noting the scientific challenges to CBLA, for example, appeared in 
the ABA Journal in 2004.  Hansen, supra note 378, at 60. 
 387 Ragland v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-SC-0388-MR, 2004 WL 2623926 (Ky. Nov. 
18, 2004).  
 388 Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006).  For a discussion 
of the case, see Kaye, supra note 361, at 103–05. 
 389 See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Md. 2006); State v. Behn, 868 
A.2d 329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (granting a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence about scientific challenges to CBLA). 
 390 Solomon, supra note 362, at A1. 
 391 Letter from Dwight E. Adams, Director, FBI Laboratory, to Ralph Grunewald, 
Executive Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (Sept. 1, 2005) 
(on file with author). 
 392 Id. 
 393 Solomon, supra note 362, at A1. 
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the defendants can be notified.394  Currently, the FBI is working co-
operatively with a task force of defense lawyers assembled by the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Innocence 
Project to identify cases in which individuals might have been wrongly 
convicted based on CBLA evidence.395  The adversary system now has 
a chance to respond appropriately to this flawed science, but it could 
not do so without the organized expertise of the NRC. 
2. Toward Institutionalized Oversight of Forensic Sciences 
As the examples in the last section show, forensic science com-
mittees can and should evaluate forensic scientific evidence and 
techniques.  Such oversight is particularly important in the forensic 
sciences used in the criminal justice system where, historically, there 
has been a dearth of rigorous, peer-reviewed testing.  Fortunately, 
there are indications that Congress might be moving in that direc-
tion, at least tentatively. 
In November 2005, Congress took a step toward institutionaliz-
ing the scientific review of forensic sciences when the House of Rep-
resentatives joined with the Senate in allocating $1,500,000 to the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences to create an independent Committee on 
Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community.396  The 
House and Senate Reports directed that the Committee, which was to 
include “members of the forensics community representing opera-
tional crime laboratories, medical examiners, and coroners; legal ex-
perts; and other scientists as determined appropriate,” was to, among 
other things, broadly examine the needs of the forensic science 
community, identify potential scientific advances, make recommen-
dations for making more and better use of the forensic sciences, and 
“disseminate best practices and guidelines concerning the collection 
and analysis of forensic evidence to help ensure quality and consis-
tency in the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve 
crimes, investigate deaths, and protect the public.”397  The Commit-
tee, co-chaired by Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit and Constantine Gatsonis, Director of the 
Center for Statistical Sciences at Brown University, has been actively 
 394 John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2007, at 
A2. 
 395 John Solomon, Lawyer Groups to Flag Cases Needing Review, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 
2007, at A9. 
 396 H.R. REP. No. 109-272, at 121 (2005); S. REP. 109-88, at 46 (2005). 
 397 S. REP. 109-88, at 46 (2005); see The National Academies, Project Information: 
Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, http://www8.nationalaca 
demies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=48741 (last visited March 6, 2008). 
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engaged in reviewing a broad range of forensic science practices, un-
dertaking the kind of searching inquiry that has largely been beyond 
the capability of most criminal case litigants.  Its report and recom-
mendations are due sometime in the summer of 2008.  Although it is 
not yet clear what the Committee will recommend, there is at least 
some apparent interest in establishing permanent mechanisms for 
providing oversight to the forensic sciences. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While our system professes to value truth, and in particular that 
version of truth that is most likely to protect the innocent, disparities 
in the adversary criminal justice system threaten that hierarchy of 
values.  At multiple points in the adversary process, criminal defen-
dants are at a distinct disadvantage, and thus the risk of error falls 
heavily  and uncomfortably on the shoulders of criminal defendants, 
even innocent criminal defendants.  The way our system handles fo-
rensic science evidence is a particularly powerful example of that im-
balance. 
One way to correct this imbalance might be to change the rules 
and processes that disadvantage defendants and to increase dramati-
cally the resources available for indigent defense legal services.  While 
such reforms might be advisable, and some even achievable, the po-
litical will is likely not there to make wholesale reforms, especially re-
forms requiring the commitment of resources for defense attorneys, 
which would be necessary to allow the adversary system to function 
properly. 
Instead, some signs are beginning to emerge in a variety of con-
texts suggesting that the weakness of adversarial adjudication can be 
replaced effectively by more reliance on administrative processes.398  
One example of this shift is the movement to provide better oversight 
of and information about forensic sciences rather than leaving it to 
the parties and case-by-case litigation to address the reliability of fo-
rensic science evidence.  The system needs a permanent forensic sci-
ence commission or institute, which could be charged with the re-
sponsibility to independently evaluate and validate the sciences, 
establish recommendations for admissibility, recommend or establish 
protocols, recommend cautionary instructions, create incentives for 
research and validation, provide funding for such research, and over-
see accreditation and blind proficiency testing. 
 398 See Brown, supra note 24, at 1591. 
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Ironically, by shifting some of the responsibility for ensuring the 
accuracy of forensic science evidence away from the adversary process 
and toward an administrative process more dependent on scientists, 
the system will provide the tools that will better permit the adversary 
process to work in criminal cases. 
 
